Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Property Tax Exemption: Nonprofit Organization Land Conservation by Siegel, Kirk G.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 49 Number 2 Article 10 
June 1997 
Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Property Tax Exemption: 
Nonprofit Organization Land Conservation 
Kirk G. Siegel 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kirk G. Siegel, Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Property Tax Exemption: Nonprofit Organization Land 
Conservation, 49 Me. L. Rev. 399 (1997). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol49/iss2/10 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION:
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION LAND
CONSERVATION
I. INTRODUC1ION ....................................... 400
I. THE BASIS FOR GRANTING EXEMPTIONS TO
CHArrABLE PURPOSES .............................. 403
A The Magnitude of Charitable Exemptions in
M aine ............................................ 407
B. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Exempt
Property at the Local Level ....................... 408
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Conservation Land ...... 409
IRI. LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MAINE
CHARIABLE EXEMPTION STATUTE IN MAINE ........ 412
IV. CORRECTING THE OVERDEPENDENCE ON THE
PROPERTY TAX ...................................... 421
A Diversifying the Tax Base ......................... 424
B. Local Option Taxes .............................. 424
V. How MuCH OF AN EXEMPTION IS FAIR? DEVISING A
MECHANISM TO COUNTER LOCAL INEQUIEsr......... 427
A. A New Tax Exemption Statute for Maine ......... 427
B. Legislative Scrutiny of Exemptions and Other Tax
Expenditures ..................................... 428
C. State Compensation for Exemption ............... 429
D. Exemption of Government Property .............. 431
E. User or Service Fees ...... ................ 432
F. User or Service Fees in Maine .................... 434
VI. CURRENT USE TAX LAWS AS ANOTHER OPTION FOR
A FAIR TAX ON CONSERVATION LANDS .............. 435
VII. CONCLUSION ......................................... 440
MAINE LAW REVIEW
WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION:
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION LAND
CONSERVATION
I. INTRODUCrION
In the state of Maine and throughout the United States, increas-
ing fiscal demands at the municipal level are exerting unprecedented
pressures on the local property tax.' Federal and state spending re-
ductions, unfunded mandates, budget deficits in some of the largest
cities, and an overdependence on property tax as the major revenue
source for municipalities are some of the main causes for scrutiny of
the property tax. Additional attacks on the property tax arise from
questions about the fairness of using property as a measure of
wealth and the role of the tax in funding education.3 Finally, local
governments are competing4 for new net-property tax producers
while shunning low-revenue producing entities, causing municipali-
ties to examine their tax rolls.5 On the other hand, the relative sta-
1. The Maine Legislature stated the situation concisely in the "Findings and pur-
pose" section of the State-municipal revenue sharing statute: "The principal prob-
lem of financing municipal services is the burden on the property tax." ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5681(1) (West 1996).
2. Nationally, state and local governments are collecting an increasing percentage
of all taxes, a trend that is expected to continue with "government service expan-
sion[s] likely to occur below the national level ... ." Daniel Shaviro, An Economic
and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 Micii. L. REv. 895, 895 (1992) (foot-
note omitted). Property taxes made up three quarters of all local tax revenues in
1991. As a percentage of total local taxes, the property tax ranges from 99.4% (New
Hampshire) to 36.9% (Alabama), with Maine ranked fifth highest in the nation at
98.6%. Philip M. Dearborn, Local Property Taxes: Emerging Trends, INTEROOVERN-
mENTAL PiRsPECIVE, Summer 1993, at 10, 11 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEFr. OF COMmERcE, Gov EnRmrNT FiNANCES IN 1990-91). As a region New Eng-
land has the largest dependence on local property tax. See id. tbl. 2.
3. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 12.
4. Tax-base sharing has been hailed as an innovative antidote to excessive com-
petition and fiscal disparities, by which all participating municipalities share in reve-
nues produced by new tax revenue growth in the area. See Note, Minnesota's
Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act-An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59 MiNN.
L. REv. 927, 935-46 (1975). See also Jack L. Dustin et al., Tax Base Sharing: The
Potential and Experience, in TAX BASE SHAR No: AN EVALUATION OF ITS USE AND
Pom'mnAL iN THE STATE OF OHo 3 (1990). Maine statute authorizes the creation
of tax base sharing districts. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5752 (West 1996).
However, only a handful of municipalities have pursued the concept. See Sharon
Mack, Tax Base-Sharing Districts Can Work, BANGOR DAmY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1993,
at 14.
5. See Editorial, Taxing Nonprofits: Is There a Trend?, ST. TAX TRENDS FOR
NoNpROFnS (National Council of Nonprofit Ass'ns), Spring 1995, at 1 [hereinafter
Taxing Nonprofits].
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bility and predictability of the property tax continue to make it an
essential part of the local tax base, and one that is likely to remain a
central part of local government operation.6
As fiscally strapped local governments review revenues from
owners of property, it is understandable that they should look to
exempt properties as potential revenue sources 7 Recently "the
principle of tax exemption is being reexamined with a vigor that is
unprecedented, at least in this generation."8 The property tax ex-
emption, allowed to charitable organizations by all states under
either statutory or constitutional provisions,9 is a natural target for
local officials. Where a single exempt property owner holds title to
a large portion of a municipality's valuation, or where exempt orga-
nizations that serve an entire region cluster in a single city,' 0 local
officials are especially bound to perceive an inequity, and hence
seek legal remedies. If the town can find grounds for questioning
the organization's exempt status, it may well assess the property as
nonexempt.
Nonprofits dedicated to the conservation of land are one class of
organization owning exempt property. Today they are engaged in a
number of strategies to minimize unnecessary conflicts with local
6. See Hugh Mields, Jr., The Property Tax: Local Revenue Maistay, INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL PERSPEcIVrE, Summer 1993, at 16 (citing the fixed nature of the tax
base, predictability of revenues, stability of yields from year to year, and reliability
as a source for local services and the payment of general obligation bonds as reasons
for local tax base perseverance).
Local governments also utilize the property tax as a means of taxing nonresident
land owners who would escape, for example, from state income tax. See CtArroN
P. Garr, LocAL Govman, mmr LAw 537-38 (1994).
7. See John K. Mullen, Property Tax Exemptions and Local Fiscal Stress, 43
NAT'L TAX J. 467 (1990) (suggesting that exemption policies are likely to figure
prominently in efforts to alleviate fiscal stress caused by predicted growth in real per
capita tax revenues).
8. Taxing Nonprofits, supra note 5, at 1. See also Charles J. Fausold & Robert J.
Liliehoim, The Economic Value of Open Space, LArmLtNmS (Lincoln Inst. of Land
Pol'y, Cambridge, Mass.), Sept. 1996, at 4 (local officials now scrutinize the fiscal
consequences of land use decisions more than ever before).
9. See W. HARisoN Wm.uoRD & JAINm G. GA.AGHER, UNFAIR COMPEnT
TION? THE CHALLENGE TO CHAUrTABL.E TAX ExETION 122 (1988). The precise
requirements for exemption vary from state to state because federalism has left
power in the states to formulate policy in this area. See also Shaviro, supra note 2
(examining the relationship between state and local taxes and federalism).
10. The fiscal impacts of exemption can be greater in non-urban areas than in
larger cities because of a greater tendency for exempt property to be unevenly dis-
tributed. Mullen, supra note 7, at 468. However, because of the tendency for non-
profit and government service providers to concentrate where they can serve the
most people, the aggregate effect is usually the greatest in cities. A self-perpetuating
cycle results, with persons needing services relocating to these areas. See O'rcm OF
PoucY AND LEGAL ANALYSm, MAINE LEGIsLATURp, THm CO&.uussioN To STUDY
THE GROWTiH OF TAX-Ex. iT PROPERTY IN MAINE's TowNs, Crrms, COUNTIES
AND REGiONS 11 (1996).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
governments over tax exemption." While some organizations are
financially incapable of foregoing their tax exemption, others do not
apply for tax exemption on all of their properties. Instead, they may
choose to: (1) pay full taxes on the property, (2) enroll the property
in a current use program and pay the reduced taxes authorized by
applicable current use statute, 2 (3) pay a service fee through an
agreement with the local government covering services provided to
the exempt property, 3 or (4) make a donation or payment in lieu of
taxes.'
4
At the same time, policy makers in a number of states have begun
to devise just mechanisms for assessing fees on exempt properties
for benefits provided to them by the municipality.' 5 These efforts
aim to reduce inevitable inequities at the local level and the ensuing
frictions between all kinds of exempt organizations and local
governments.
This Comment addresses the issue of property tax exemption for
nonprofit organizations, especially those dedicated to land conserva-
tion. Part II looks at the general grounds for exempting nonprofits
from taxation generally, and analyzes how land conservation fits
into the doctrine of charitable exemption. This analysis is aided by
an inquiry into the economics of land conservation-the cost-benefit
balance of land that is not available for development. Part III ana-
lyzes the legal doctrines of property tax exemption embodied in re-
cent decisions in Maine and the nation, and how well they reflect the
doctrines of charitable exemption discussed in Part II. Part IV ad-
dresses the specific deficiencies in the property tax which tend to put
pressure on exemptions for conservation and other nonprofit land
uses, and suggests such remedies as adopting a broader based array
of taxes to relieve pressure on the property tax. Part V proposes
mechanisms for taxing conservation and other exempt land fairly in
the context of its value to local governments and to society while
protecting local governments from potentially inequitable fiscal
losses. Part VI describes current use statutes that attempt to relieve
the tax burden on land that is providing benefits associated with
open space. These statutes tax such land at a value based on its
current use, rather than the normal taxation at the highest and best
use. This Part also examines whether current use classification for
conservation lands is an option that properly reflects the public ben-
efits they provide.
11. This observation derives from the Author's experience as board president of
a local conservation organization over a ten-year period.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. See ME. REv. STAT. ArN. tit. 36, § 652(l)(L) (West 1990).
14. See Monroe H. Rosner, In-Lieu-of-Tax Payment by Exempt Organizations:
Issues, Trends and Innovations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-NINmh ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 104 (Stanley J. Bowers & Janet L. Staton eds., 1986).
15. See infra Part V.
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II. TH- BASIS FOR GRANTING EXEMPTIONS TO
CHARITABLE PURPOSES
Why should nonprofit organizations16 be subsidized by being ex-
empted from taxation? This question is increasingly asked by mu-
nicipal governments and land-owning taxpayers who perceive a
revenue loss at the local level, imposed upon them by actors at the
state level. Numerous theories may answer their increasingly vocif-
erous questions. Nonprofit sector advocates claim that the underly-
ing criteria for whether income or property is taxable is whether it is
used for private, individual purposes.1 They argue that property
that does not advance private interests but rather solely advances
the welfare of the community should not be taxed."8 This is so be-
cause activities that directly or indirectly relieve government of its
burden of providing services or benefits logically do not merit hav-
ing their capacities reduced by government taxation, especially
when government has been unable or does not choose to provide
the recognized public benefit. 9 At least in a general sense, the list
of categories that are typically exempt supports this division, and
includes: property of state, federal, and local government; certain
public works; and charitable, literary, and scientific institutions.2 °
Statutes require all income of nonprofits to further the organiza-
tion's tax-exempt purpose, with no income inuring to the benefit of
private individuals except as reasonable compensation for services
rendered.21
Nonprofit conservation organizations serve, in economic terms, as
private market providers of public goods-goods which, if supplied
to one individual, are also available to all other members of soci-
ety.' A charitable public good often arises due to a form of market
failure, in which neither the for-profit sector nor the government has
16. A nonprofit organization may earn profits, but it may not distribute them to
the individuals who control it. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit En-
terprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 838 (1980).
17. See iL
18. See WELLxoRD & GALLAGHER, supra note 9, at 123.
19. Perhaps the more difficult legislative question is which organizations and
properties merit being considered as relieving a government burden and thus quali-
fying for exemption under state statute. Maine effectively imposes upon municipali-
ties its own definition of government burden. See infra Part mI.
20. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 651-652 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997).
21. See id. § 652(1)(C)(2). Some states withhold exemption if the organization
regularly earns more in fees than it spends. WNuLsoR & GALLAGHER, supra note
9, at 122-23.
22. See eg., Hansmann, supra note 16, at 848 (defining public goods as those that
cost no more to provide to many persons than to one person and which, once pro-
vided, cannot be kept from other persons enjoying them); Developments in the
Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HAxV. L REv. 1578, 1624 n.88 (1992) (citing
national defense and pollution control as examples of public goods); Fausold &
Lilieholm, supra note 8, at 2 (public goods are nonexcludable and nonconsumptive).
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provided for something recognized as essential.3 In the land con-
servation context, for example, the organization fills a demand for
conservation land with donations from patrons who are either actual
users of the conserved lands or who derive a psychic benefit from
the perceived effect of their donation. The number of free riders-
those who make no donation but who actively or passively derive
benefits from conservation land-is undoubtedly great. But where
the paying patrons constitute a critical mass, the nonprofit provider
is able to operate, assisted by government policies on property tax
exemption and the tax deductibility of donations.
The preferential tax treatment of conservation organizations is
based in part, then, on the assumption that it is delivering a public
benefit to a constituency composed both of patrons and free riders,
where private individuals, corporations, or government are not suffi-
ciently able to provide the function affordably.t Further, although
demand for the good may not command a great enough political
majority to cause government to supply it directly, a significant level
of demand for the good exists, as evidenced by the charitable sup-
port of the nonprofit organization.' The fact that the purposes of
the organization must satisfy the statutory requirements that a legis-
lative majority has agreed merit the subsidy further reflects a socie-
tal choice for conservation.26
Legislative findings reveal consistent implicit support for this eco-
nomic theory of conserved land as public goods. Maine's Protection
23. An inevitable debate involves the definition of "essential." See infra Part V.
24. "Conservation trusts present a special case of the nonprofit... performing
quasi-public functions.... [T]his is a function which very few private individuals or
corporations can afford to perform and is therefore a proper one for government to
support through exemption from tax." C. K. Cobb, Jr., Property Tax Exemptions
for Nonprofit Institutions (1972) (unpublished memorandum), quoted in OLIVER
OLDMAN & FERDINAND P. SCHOETrLE, STATE Am LocAL TAXES AND FINANCE
346 (1974).
25. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 22, at
1624.
26. It has been argued that the so-called subsidy of an exemption is a limited one
in that the government does not necessarily contribute to other costs of the charita-
ble activity other than by relieving the burden of the tax. OLD AN & SCHOBTrLE,
supra note 24, at 330. However, depending on the nonprofit activity, government
may in fact provide direct services to nonprofits. As a local example, Bangor has
contributed $2.5 million to the nonprofit Bangor Public Library. Telephone Inter-
view with Erik Stumpfel, Bangor City Solicitor (June 1996). Similarly, if the regional
hospital expands from seven to eight stories, a new ladder truck is required or Ban-
gor's fire insurance will increase by over $1 million; in either case, the hospital will
likely contribute nothing. See i. If the hospital buys a parking lot valued at $1
million and it is exempted from property tax, the immediate impact, at least, is a
direct revenue loss to the city. See id.
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of Natural Resources Act2 7 is illustrative of the public benefit that
the legislature has found to inhere in land conservation:
The Legislature finds and declares that the State's rivers and
streams, great ponds, fragile mountain areas, freshwater wet-
lands, significant wildlife habitat, coastal wetlands and coastal
sand dunes systems are resources of state significance. These
resources have great scenic beauty and unique characteristics,
unsurpassed recreational, cultural, historical and environmen-
tal value of present and future benefit to the citizens of the
State .... 28
Conservation organizations that concentrate their efforts on pre-
serving such resources for the benefit of the public are presumably
at the donative rather than the commercial end of nonprofits, in that
their incomes generally derive from donations rather than from fees
for services or goods. 9 As such, they are generally in a less suspect
class' of the nonprofit spectrum. This provides some immunity
from the accounting that is increasingly being sought of the United
States' 1.1 million nonprofits,3 many of which have spun off suc-
cessful commercial ventures arguably straying far afield from their
stated tax-exempt purposes.32
Exempt organizations are obviously a diverse group. While critics
of tax exemption cite egregious examples of the abuse of their non-
profit status,1 defenders cite an equally profound belief in the sanc-
tity of the nonprofit sector. This group of defenders resists turning
to nonprofits as a tax revenue source, since they are, in fact, vital
27. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-A to 480-Y (West 1989 & Pamph. 1996-
1997).
28. Id. § 480-A.
29. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 22, at
1620.
30. See id. Some conservation organizations have significant commercial compo-
nents in their overall operations. Exemption is arguably less deserved if the organi-
zation's local activities generate sufficient revenues to pay for local services, or if the
activities largely benefit the middle and upper classes. See Rebecca S. Rudnick,
State and Local Taxes on Nonprofit Organizations, 22 CAP. U.L Rnv. 321, 336-37
(1993).
31. While no state bars the collection of fees by nonprofits entirely, a number of
states require organizations to offer free or below-cost service, or require at least
some of the organization's income to come from charitable contributions as opposed
to fees. See W~nw.For & GALLAGHER, supra note 9, at 126-27.
32. Edward T. Pound et al., Tax Exemptl, U.S. NEws & Womw REMoRT, Oct. 2,
1995, at 36,51 (reporting that New York City's exempt nonprofits could yield more
than $524 million in property taxes). According to an analysis of the Internal Reve-
nue Service's records, the United States' 1.1 million nonprofits generate $1.1 trillion
in revenue, control $1.475 trillion in assets, and are growing by 45,000 organizations
per year. See i& at 36.
33. Critics of exemption policies point to abusers of the system such as a church
that classified over 100 acres of land as a cemetery in order to get a tax exemption,
despite the fact that only one body was buried there. OLmtm & ScrroErrT, supra
note 24, at 323-24.
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service providers themselves. The explicit rationale is that taxing
this sector makes as much sense as taxing government itself.3n With-
out this rationale, the argument against taxing exempt organizations
is diminished. But to the extent that exempt organizations supply
vital services and their benefits inure to public and not private bene-
ficiaries, the rationale remains valid. The greatest source of tension
is the fact that defining what constitutes an exempt sector is done at
the state level, yet local governments are most acutely affected.
Regardless of the moral force behind nonprofit activities, critics
of tax exemptions are quick to point out that they are tax expendi-
tures. 35 When state government exempts an entity from a tax that it
otherwise would have to pay, it is argued that it is in essence spend-
ing this foregone revenue and making a fiscal choice favoring activi-
ties that qualify as exempt, often at the expense of the local
government. Tension arises when the resulting benefits are not
shared equally among either the state's nonprofits or its
municipalities. 36
34. As stated by a leader in the nonprofit sector:
The problems faced by the local, state and federal governments are the
result of converging structural, economic and demographic forces. Non-
profits have, in fact, tended to be the bulwarks of economically troubled
areas. Nonprofits embody and sustain the fundamental social, cultural, and
spiritual values of trust, compassion, justice and moral behavior that bind
us together. For this reason we as a society gave them a special status as
tax-exempt entities.
Memorandum attaching Statement on Nonprofit Tax Exemption from Ann Mitchell,
National Council of Nonprofit Associations, to Nonprofit Minutepersons 3 (Jun. 1,
1995) (on file with the Maine Law Review).
A countervailing view is that many individuals and enterprises with similar noble
motivations must pay taxes. Memorandum from Professor Orlando Delogu, Uni-
versity of Maine School of Law (Sept. 1996) (on file with the Maine Law Review).
35. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 22, at
1620-21 (1992). See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 195-196 (West 1990) (in-
cluding exemptions as "tax expenditures [that] constitute a permanent reduction in
tax revenues... and result in an increased tax burden on taxpayers who are not
benefited").
36. For example, the organization that has minimal land and profits derives little
benefit from its exempt status, while the nonprofit with greater assets does. See
Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 22, at 1621. See also
Rudnick, supra note 30, at 336 (stating that poor, struggling entities may not benefit
from exemptions while wealthy nonprofits receive significant benefit).
Another economic argument leveled against nonprofits is that exemptions afford
them an unfair market share. However, there is evidence that removing exemptions
for a given service may not increase the market share of for-profit providers of that
service. For example, higher tax rates for hospitals will make it more likely that only
one hospital can survive financially in a given community, but it does not make the
nonprofit hospital any more likely to succeed than the for-profit. See Cyril F. Chang
& Howard P. Tuckman, Do Higher Property Tax Rates Increase the Market Share of
Nonprofit Hospitals?, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 175, 185 (1990).
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A. The Magnitude of Charitable Exemptions in Maine
To appreciate the legal issues involved in property tax exemption,
it is useful to put conservation organization tax exemption into per-
spective. Exempt land of conservation organizations is a small frac-
tion of three quarters of one percent of Maine's total property
valuation. 7 All classes of tax-exempt property make up approxi-
mately thirteen percent of the total Maine property valuation.' Of
this fraction, municipal, federal, and state lands comprise well over
half of exempt property values.39 Charitable and literary/scientific
organizations account for, respectively, six percent and eleven per-
cent of exempt property values.0 Charitable organizations account
for approximately three quarters of one percent of all of Maine's
valuations.4'
Since conservation organizations are just one of the many kinds of
nonprofits that are normally in the charitable classification, their
lands constitute an even smaller fraction of this three quarters of
one percent.42 Recent statistics indicate that the exempt properties'
share of total state valuation in Maine has actually decreased-from
twelve percent in 1984, to eleven percent in 1986, to ten percent in
1994. 3 However, the importance of the exemption to conservation
efforts and the level of opposition to exemptions in a number of
municipalities merits an understanding of how the legal basis of ex-
emption relates to the economic and social theories discussed in
Part II.
37. See MAnE MuNcIAI AssoCATION, TAx Exzuir PROPERTrY IN MAINE: hlt-
PAcr ON LocAL TAx BASES 1 (1989).
38. See id. A useful figure in this analysis would be an estimate of the degree of
undervaluation of exempt properties.
39. See id
40. See id
41. See id See also PROPERTY TAx DIvISION, MAINE BuREAu OF TAXATION,
1994 MUN. VALUATION RETURN STATISTICAL SUbibARY, part v.
42. See id.
43. See Roy W. LENARDSON & SmIRIN BLAISDE.L, O mcE OF PoLic AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS, THE COMbSSION TO STUDY ThE GRowm OF TAx-Exnbwr
PROPERTY IN MAINE'S TowNs, CrrIms, COUNTmS AND REoIONS 17 (1996). The as-
sessed value of tax-exempt property in Maine, taken as a proportion of all tax-ex-
empt and taxable property declined over the years 1984-1994. This finding excludes
federally owned property, and is based on municipal records. See id Several cave-
ats important to interpretation of these figures are: (1) valuations for tax-exempt
property tend to be less accurate, since assessors have little incentive to ascertain
just valuation; (2) valuation is largely self-reported and can be very low, based on
old information, or very high, based on insurance replacement costs; (3) comparable
sales, especially arms-length transactions of unique lands and other nonprofit prop-
erty are relatively rare; and (4) many municipalities did reassessments during this
period because their properties were undervalued, and exempt properties are less
likely to have been reassessed. See id.
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B. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Exempt Property at the
Local Level
It has been argued that local government is best suited to weigh
the burdens and benefits of a nonprofit corporation in the commu-
nity because of the impact of property tax exemption on its tax base,
and because it is best able to monitor the level of public benefit the
nonprofit is providing." As a form of state level tax expenditure
with potentially large local impact, exemptions have been framed as
an overreaching of the states' centralized taxing power.45 In theory,
perhaps, the local government should be able to exempt the non-
profit only to the extent that it provides some measurable quantum
of public benefits to local residents.46
Such a proposal is problematic in that most nonprofit activity in
town X, including conservation, often benefits the residents of town
Y. The veto power of any individual town over an activity on the
grounds that the local benefits are too meager would seem to stymie
many ventures that provide multi-jurisdictional benefits.47 The po-
tential for this veto power to exacerbate parochialism makes it a
cause for concern. At the same time, a town should, perhaps, not
have to bear the entire burden when half of its valuation is owned
by an exempt organization that makes use of the property in a man-
ner that provides broad benefits to residents throughout the state.
Oft-cited examples in this category are municipalities whose univer-
sities and hospitals serve residents from throughout a state or re-
gion, but whose service needs are borne solely by the local property
taxpayers.48 The tension between local and non-local beneficiaries
can be glaring, or at least appear to be so.
In the context of land conservation, some writers have suggested
that while keeping land undeveloped provides a public benefit, the
44. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 22, at
1626-27 (urging a rebuttable presumption that all of a nonprofit's property is taxable
when a municipality tries to revoke its property tax exemption). Technically speak-
ing, Maine law is consistent with this policy in that the legal presumption is that all
property is taxable. See infra Part II.
45. See CHARLES E. McLuRE, JR. & PETER MmszKowsKl, FIscAL FEDERALISM
AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 106 (1983) (recognizing that many
commentators believe "[lI]ower levels of government ... to be ... more responsive
to needs ... of local residents and more effective at providing public goods and
services of a purely local sort").
46. New York passed a statute in 1971 allowing municipalities to remove the ex-
emption status from, inter alia, historical societies, libraries, bar associations, play-
ground associations, and missionary societies. See Rosner, supra note 14, at 106, 109
n.3. (citing 1971 N.Y. Laws, ch. 50-A, § 420-b). Only a handful of local jurisdictions
have used this power. See id
47. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 22, at
1628 (conceding that under local veto, exemptions could be defeated due to the not-
in-my-backyard syndrome, religious or other discrimination, or other bias).
48. See id. at 1632-33.
[Vol. 49:399408
LAND CONSERVATION
specific individuals who use the land for recreation should pay a fee
for that benefit, and the municipality should levy an excise on the
receipts.49 Yet, communities often fail to analyze the benefits of ex-
empt activities, as is the case with undeveloped land. Thus, even if
municipalities had the ability to grant or deny exemptions on their
own, their analytical capabilities are often found wanting and their
opposition to the exemption of conservation land may have no basis
in fact."° Part V of this Comment describes the possible outlines of
such a system, and the challenges of creating a system that is man-
ageable and equitable.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Conservation Land
Given the potential tension just described, an examination of both
the local and regional monetary and non-monetary costs and bene-
fits of land conservation is critical. This is especially so in light of
the commonplace assumption that development will increase local
tax revenues and thus relieve the individual landowner's tax burden,
and the concomitant belief that land preserved by a tax-exempt con-
servation organization is inherently a drain on the local tax base. A
significant body of research shows that the contrary is often true."
Open space, even if it is owned by an exempt organization that pays
49. See Cobb, supra note 24. Alternatively, Cobb suggests making income pro-
ducing properties of nonprofits fully taxable at the local rate, as are the auxiliary
services of various nonprofit institutions in some jurisdictions. See 1d. But cf. Maine
Med. Ctr. v. Lucci, 317 A.2d 1, 2 (Me. 1974) (reaffirming the property tax exemption
for parking facility which generated income where such utilization is not oriented
toward pecuniary profit). See infra Part V.D. for the related discussion of direct
benefit service fees.
50. See AMERICAN FARzU.AND TRusT, Is FARha-AND PROTECrON A CO.WU-
Nrry INwvsimENT? How To Do A Cost oF CohwNrrY SRvics S'mv (1993).
For example, "[a]lIthough a rural acre with a new house will undoubtedly generate
more total revenue than an acre of cows or corn, such simplistic arguments do not
provide communities with a realistic bottom line." Id. at 1.
51. See, ag., MAnm CoAsT HERrrAoE TRUST, Tl-ttumcAL BuU.ETN No. 112,
THE PosrrVE ECONOMICS OF CONSERVATION (1991) [hereinafter THE Posrvn Ec-
ONOMICS OF CONSERVATION]. See also NATIONAL PARK SERVIcE, ECONOMIC Ibl-
PACTS OF PROTECrING P1'vERs, TRAILS, AND GREENWAY CoRRORS (1990)
(providing a methodology to quantify the effects of land protection on property val-
ues, tourism, public cost reduction, and commerce). 'The unfortunate conclusion of
this analysis is that nonprofit residential land uses put the greatest fiscal burden on
municipalities. See also DEBoRAii BRIGHMON, MANE COAST HERIrTAGE TRUST,
OPEN LAND, DEVELoPME-NT, LAND CONSERVATION AND PROPERTY TAXES IN
MAni's ORGANIZED MuNiciPALrriss (1995). Brighton concludes:
It is generally true in Maine that the towns with the most development
have higher rather than lower tax bills.... [O]pen land pays more in taxes
than it costs the town in services while the opposite is true for residences;
commercial and industrial developments, although they pay more in taxes
than they directly cost the town to service, create jobs and people move in
to fill the jobs; and, larger towns have more services and larger budgets.
For this reason, permanent protection of land should not be looked at as
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no property tax, may be more fiscally advantageous than a new resi-
dential subdivision. The costs of residential development in addi-
tional solid waste disposal, education, police and fire protection,
road maintenance, and other services frequently result in an in-
crease in the local tax rate.52 For example, a study conducted in
South Portland, Maine, found that while the commercial-industrial
sector generated slightly more in revenue than it demanded in serv-
ices, residential growth was a net loser, costing one dollar in services
for every seventy-seven cents of revenue.5 3 A related, though
smaller, negative effect of higher valuations is the corresponding de-
crease in revenues from the state educational subsidy, which is in-
versely related to local valuation. 54
According to the betterment theory, conservation land may actu-
ally increase adjacent land values, thus supporting the tax base indi-
rectly, even if taxable value is lost by virtue of exemption of the
conservation property.55 Economists often use this type of analysis
to infer the social value of potentially intangible public goods by
proxy. 6 Other benefits inferable by proxy that municipalities might
overlook if their calculus is strictly focused on an exempt property's
lost valuation include: the land's value in preserving a landscape
precluding a more lucrative option; it may be more appropriate to look at it
as protection against a more expensive option.
Id at 3.
52. See Trm Posrrv ECONOMICS OF CONSERVATION, supra note 51, at 2. See
also AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, supra note 50. Three studies in Massachusetts
by the American Farmland Must found that "[flor every dollar of revenue raised
from the residential sector.... towns spent $1.12 on public services[, while] for every
dollar raised by undeveloped lands, towns spent 33 cents .... ." Id. at 2. In addition,
there is a local multiplier effect from active forest and farm land that is even greater.
See id. at 3. "Common estimates place the multiplier effect of local agriculture at $3
to $5.... [Flor every dollar received from farmers.... $3 - $5 are earned by local
businesses and processors serving farmers and their customers." Id It should be
noted that the multiplier effect cannot be claimed exclusively by these land uses;
indeed, a commercial land use has a similar effect. The concept simply stands as a
rebuttal to the proposition that undeveloped land has little economic utility.
53. See THE PosrrIIV ECONOMICS OF CONSERVATION, supra note 51, at 2.
54. Under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5681(4) (West 1996), "[t]hose munic-
ipalities having a greater property tax burden.., receive a larger per capita revenue-
sharing distribution."
55. See Kenneth A. Clarke, Taxation of Preservation Interests as Property in Ver-
mont, 5 VT. L. REv. 161, 177 (1980) (citing studies of benefits accruing to land par-
cels adjacent to conservation and historic conservation land reflected by increased
taxable values); ODMAN & Scrio'LE supra note 24, at 346 ("[A] higher price can
be charged for a room with a view than for a room on an airshaft."). The phenome-
non is known by appraisers as "enhancement," and is a well-documented factor in
appraising property. The potential for exempt properties to generate positive net
benefits has been recognized, where the "property is sufficiently stimulative of eco-
nomic activity." Mullen, supra note 7, at 468.
56. See FAUSOLD & LILEHOLM, supra note 8, at 4.
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that attracts tourism, recreation,57 or commerce to the area; the
availability of the land for public recreation or educational use; and
its role in conserving wildlife and other ecological systems that are
enjoyed by citizens of the municipality and visitors.5
This discussion can be distilled into three main conclusions. First,
land conservation-lilce many other exempt uses of land-provides
clear public benefits that legislatures have recognized as being wor-
thy of exemption from local property tax. Second, municipal budg-
ets stretched thin by inherent deficiencies in a system that relies
almost wholly on the property tax may erroneously limit their
calculus to the difference between the direct tax revenues from ex-
empt versus non-exempt property, without looking at the benefits
the exempt properties provide and the municipal costs avoided by
keeping land undeveloped. Third, concern at the local level may be
exacerbated by numerous factors which obscure the perception of
the public benefit from conservation land: the imposition of the ex-
emption scheme by state government; a high concentration of ex-
empt property in a given municipality disproportionate to local
benefits; and beliefs of local citizens and assessors about equitable
distribution of the property tax burden. 9 In light of these conclu-
sions, the operative analysis from a societal perspective may be less
one of an overall comparison of benefits to costs, and more an in-
quiry into whether the burdens of this public good are adequately
shared between local residents and nonresidents.
The foregoing discussion affirms the philosophical bases for the
exemption of nonprofit providers in general, and conservation orga-
nizations in particular. At the same time, it recognizes the preva-
lence of common misperceptions about the social and economic
value of conservation land. These misperceptions, combined with
frequent instances of local inequities and the high degree of pres-
sure on the property tax as a local revenue source, may increasingly
cause legal scrutiny of various aspects of property tax exemption.
Part HI of the Comment examines the legal foundation for exemp-
tion and the challenges municipalities have brought against the ex-
empt status of conservation and other exempt properties.
57. Methodologies for calculating the monetary value of outdoor recreational ac-
tivities have been widely recognized. See id. at 3.
58. These factors are among those in the public benefit test required for tax re-
duction in Maine's Farm and Open Space Tax Law. M.. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tiL 36,
§ 1102(6) (West 1990). See infra Part VI for a discussion of current use taxation
policies.
59. Resentment in certain communities may arise from the perceived ability of
the wealthy to take better advantage of the estate tax and income tax benefits asso-
dated with nonprofit land conservation programs. Also, conservation organizations
often attract and may deliberately cultivate a highly educated segment of the popu-
lation for fund raising and leadership. Local efforts to prevent perceived benefits for
the rich may thus take on a strong populist flavor.
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III. LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MAINE CHARITABLE
EXEMPTION STATUTE
Challenges to tax exemptions by town officials may rest on a
number of legal foundations, but most have been directed at
whether the organization's purposes or its uses of the exempt prop-
erty actually comport with state statute. 60 Interestingly, the require-
ments for exempt status have been interpreted differently by the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, municipali-
ties, nonprofits, and the State Bureau of Taxation.61
This part of the Comment finds that Maine decisions regarding
property tax exemption establish relatively stringent procedural re-
quirements for property owned by entities dedicated to the conser-
vation of land and wildlife. These decisions have precluded
exemption for a number of properties whose uses are arguably ben-
eficial to the public. 2 At the same time, recent decisions of the Law
Court reaffirm the relatively broad definition of the charitable clas-
sification upon which most land conservation organization exemp-
tions are based.63 The legal theories underlying the broader
definition of "charitable" in these decisions are supported by gener-
ally accepted notions of the societal support merited by public goods
providers which relieve a burden of government and whose benefits
do not inure to individuals.64 These decisions, at a societal or
macroeconomic perspective, are an expression of Maine's exemp-
tion policy. Simply put, the legal system attempts to consider the
overall societal benefits of Maine's nonprofit sector in determining
which organizations merit exemption, but does not consider local
costs and benefits.65
60. Telephone Interview with David Ledew, Maine State Bureau of Taxation
(July 9, 1995) (noting differences in the interpretation of the term "charitable").
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., The Nature Conservancy of the Pine Tree State, Inc. v. Town of
Bristol, 385 A.2d 39, 42 (Me. 1978) (tax exemption precluded if grantors transfer
title to conservation organizations but reserve rights of access, passage, or
custodianship).
63. See, e.g., Town of Poland v. Poland Spring Health Inst., 649 A.2d 1098, 1100
(Me. 1994) (allowing exemption as long as institution is organized and conducting its
operation for purely benevolent and charitable purposes in good faith with produc-
tion of revenue "purely incidental" to a dominant purpose which is benevolent and
charitable") (citing Green Acre Baha'i Inst. v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 354, 110
A.2d 581, 584 (1954).
64. See supra Part H.
65. In general, there may be judicial resistance to an attempt to measure the
nonprofit's delivery of local benefits when the organization's purpose and activities
are shown to be generally consistent with the exemption statute. In Maine, at least
once, the Law Court has encountered and rejected a municipality's attempt to argue
that a nonprofit was not charitable because it failed to show that the supposed bene-
ficiaries of its largesse were better off than they would be without its services. See
Maine AFL-CIO Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Town of Madawaska, 523 A.2d 581,585 (Me.
1987). The court was satisfied that the purposes of the nonprofit, a housing corpora-
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To the extent that inequities occur at a local level where particular
exempt properties exert demands that are disproportionate to the
benefits they provide, judicial action is not the optimal vehicle for
providing relief without further legislative direction. In Parts IV
and V of this Comment, the Author suggests precisely such legisla-
tive reform through mechanisms for reducing local dependence on
the property tax and a system for measuring costs and benefits of
exempt properties. The discussion of current use tax laws in Part VI
provides an example of how existing Maine statutes include a sys-
tem which reduces-though does not eliminate-taxation of unde-
veloped land commensurate with the public benefits it provides and
its costs to the local fisc.
In legal terms, nonprofits face the presumption that real property
is taxable. Real property located within the state is generally sub-
ject to taxation at the local rate,' prompting the Law Court to state:
"[T]axation is the rule and... exemptions are exceptions to the rule
and are to be strictly construed."'  The property owner carries the
burden of proving the qualification for exemption, and uncertainty
as to entitlement for the exemption is weighted in favor of
taxation.6
Only assessors, acting under the power granted to them by state69
statute, are empowered to grant exemptions. Assessors are agents
of the state, authorized by legislative authority to grant exemptions
if presented with satisfactory written evidence by the entity seeking
exemption.70 Assessors also possess the potent authority to require
tion, fit within the general purposes of congressional policy furthering housing for
elderly and handicapped persons. See id at 584-85. The court did not require an
actual quantification of the local benefits provided by the specific nonprofit. See i
at 585.
66. MAINE DEP'T OF ADMIN. & FiN. SERV., MAmNE PRoPERTY TAx LAv-. BAsic
CounsE 2, 63 (1994). Property tax in Maine is a local government responsibility in
incorporated cities, towns, and plantations. In the unincorporated area, the state
administers property taxes. See id at 22.
While all real property is subject to taxation, various mechanisms effectively alter
the liability for property tax. In addition to allowing exemption for nonprofit and
other entities, the state also uses the taxation system to subsidize economic develop-
ment, for example through tax increment financing. See ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit.
30-A, §§ 5251-5261 (Vest 1996 & Supp. 1996-1997).
67. Owls Head v. Dodge, 151 Me. 473, 481, 121 A.2d 347, 352-53 (1956). "Tax-
payers may appeal to the Board of Property Tax Review, county commissioners, or
to the Superior Court for relief from decisions of the county commissioners." [Me.]
All St. Tax Rep. (CCM) 2073.
68. NMANE DEP'T OF Arnn.i & FiN. SERv., supra note 66, at 63 (citing Silverman
v. Alton, 451 A.2d 103, 105 (Me. 1982)). See also Hurricane Island Outward Bound
v. V'malhaven, 372 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Me. 1977).
69. See MAINE DEPT OF ADMNu. & FiN. SEnv., supra note 66, at 63.
70. See id The Bureau of Taxation directs its assessors to verify statutory eligibil-
ity for exemption by insisting on: "a fiscal report for the corporation's preceding
fiscal year, a copy of the property deed, a copy of the articles of incorporation filed
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taxpayers to furnish, under oath and in writing, lists of their prop-
erty, its nature, situation, and value.71 Municipalities do not possess
the power to establish exemptions. This derives from the theory
that, if they did, local majorities could, by vote, unfairly single out
those on whom the burdens of taxation fall.7
Maine statute provides two categories of locally exempt property
that are relevant to nonprofit conservation organizations: "real es-
tate.., owned and occupied or used solely for their own purposes
by benevolent and charitable institutions incorporated by this
State ' 73 and "real estate... owned and occupied or used solely for
their own purposes by literary and scientific institutions."'74 Non-
profit land conservation organizations are typically classified as be-
nevolent and charitable. The literary and scientific category might
apply to certain conservation organizations." A conservation or-
ganization claiming a scientific classification must show that science
is its "only primary object."'76
In municipalities where there is a perception that land-owning
conservation organizations are not paying their way, assessors may
scrutinize applications for exemption and possibly reject them,
claiming they do not satisfy the statutory requirements. 77 Past chal-
lenges to conservation land exemption claims reveal that entities de-
sirous of such tax exemption must operate within definite
boundaries, which the Law Court will scrutinize.78
While exemption on a literary and scientific basis is generally
strictly construed for nonprofit organizations, the claim to a benevo-
with the Maine Secretary of State, a copy of the by-laws and a description of how the
various elements of the property are being used." Id. at 65.
71. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 706 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997).
72. That the power to tax and grant exemptions vests exclusively in the legisla-
ture was first forcefully asserted in Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62 (1873),
which invalidated Maine statutes giving municipalities discretion to dispense certain
property tax exemptions. The Law Court likened such exemptions to raising tax
money and giving it away, in derogation of the principle that assessments must be
public. The Law Court stated: "To have uniformity of taxation, the imposition of,
and the exemption from taxation, must be by one and the same authority-that of
the legislature." Id at 74. See also ME. CONST. art. IX, § 9 ("The Legislature shall
never, in any manner, suspend or surrender the power of taxation.").
73. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996-1997).
74. Id. § 652(1)(B) (West 1990).
75. Telephone Interview with David Ledew, Property Appraiser, Maine State
Bureau of Taxation (July 1995).
76. Hurricane Island Outward Bound v. Vinalhaven, 372 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Me.
1977).
77. The uncertainty of local tax exemption policy for conservation land may
cause the nonprofit to take legal action. In Nature Conservancy of the Pine Tree
State, Ina v. Town of Bristol, 385 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978), the land conservation organi-
zation sought a declaratory judgment to determine the tax exempt status of land it
owned.
78. See infra note 83.
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lent and charitable exemption is treated more liberally by the Law
Court. Thus in Hurricane Island Outward Bound v. Vinalhaven,79
the Law Court rejected Outward Bound's claim to a section
652(1)(B) scientific organization exemption because there was no
statement in the outdoor school's charter that its objects were exclu-
sively scientific."0
In Silverman v. Town of Alton,8 1 even a wildlife sanctuary incor-
porated as a charitable trust for the sole benefit of the University of
Maine-itself a valid literary and scientific institution-was deemed
non-exempt.' 2 The mere creation of a sanctuary for the protection
of wildlife did not bring into being a scientific institution, notwith-
standing the fact that the sanctuary permitted or encouraged scien-
tific studies or educational uses.83 The court found that the trust's
primary purpose was to create a haven for wildlife, and that the sci-
entific objectives were merely incidenta31.
79. 372 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1977).
80. Id. at 1047. The Law Court restated this rule in Nature Conservancy of the
Pine Tree State, Inc. v. Town of Bristol, 385 A.2d at 41 n.3. While the distinction
between exemption for literary and scientific and the exemption for charitable and
benevolent purposes may appear trivial, it shows the presence of the boundaries
within which conservation organizations are permitted to operate.
81. 451 A.2d 103 (Me. 1982).
82. See i& at 106.
83. See id The court rejected the University's claim that it held equitable title as
sole beneficiary of the trust. See id. The Court found that this interest did not qual-
ify the trust for exemption based on the University's exempt status. See id. Only
property owned and occupied by the charitable organization or used solely for its
own purposes will be exempted from property taxation. See Mn. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 652(1)(A) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997). In Silverman, the trustees of the
sanctuary had significant powers precluding the University's exclusive use or occu-
pation. See Silverman v. Town of Alton, 451 A.2d at 106.
The exclusive use or occupation requirement limits exemption of conservation
land in other ways. In Nature Conservancy of the Pine Tree State, Inc. v. Town of
Bristol, 385 A.2d at 42, the Law Court held that tax exemption is precluded where a
grantor transfers title to a charitable organization but reserves rights of access, pas-
sage, or custodianship. The court stated:
We hold that the intendment of [M. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(1)(A)]
is to deny the tax exemption where there is an attempt by grantors to re-
serve private rights of use without the incident burden of paying taxes for
the enjoyment of the property. The word "solely" is employed to indicate
that a grantor who conveys property to the charitable institution may not
retain any strings in terms of use.
I& at 43. This rule does not preclude exemption of property used by an ancillary
service that is not profit-oriented and is reasonably related to the principal purpose
of the charitable institution. See Maine Medical Ctr. v. Lucci, 317 A2d 1, at 3 (Me.
1974) (upholding exemption for hospital parking facility that charged fees where
purpose of facility was "reasonably incident to the major purpose for which a benev-
olent and charitable institution is incorporated"). But see City of Lewiston v.
Marcotte Congregate Hous., Inc., 673 A.2d 209 (Me. 1996) (applying liberal inter-
pretation of "charitable purposes" while denying exemption to a building, 18% of
which was not used solely for the organization's charitable purpose).
84. Silverman v. Town of Alton, 451 A.2d at 106.
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In Holbrook Island Sanctuary v. Brooksville,s the Law Court
found a charitable organization's wildlife sanctuary was not inher-
ently exempt from taxation.s This holding, that a benefit to wild
animals did not equate to a benefit to the community and was there-
fore not charitable, might be assessed differently by a court with a
modem awareness of the public benefits of ecosystem preservation.
Yet it should allay the belief that any undeveloped land held by any
organization may be deemed exempt. The sanctuary also failed to
qualify as a scientific institution, despite the facts that the area was
available for nature study, observation and photography, and that
the site housed a library on nature and conservation.' 7
While few Maine cases have considered organizations dedicated
to land conservation, these organizations are most likely to satisfy
exemption requirements by incorporating as charitable and benevo-
lent organizations. Town of Poland v. Poland Spring Health Insti-
tute, Inc.s represents the current, more liberal interpretation of the
benevolent and charitable classification. In Poland Spring Health
Institute, the town challenged the medical center's tax-exempt sta-
tus, claiming that the Institute's religious affiliation compromised its
benevolent and charitable purposes.8 9
In rejecting the town's argument, the court reaffirmed the fairly
nonspecific test for benevolent and charitable tax exempion status
set out in Green Acre Baha'i Institute v. Town of Eliot.' To deter-
mine whether an organization is tax-exempt:
85. 161 Me. 476, 214 A.2d 660 (1965).
86. See id at 484-86, 214 A.2d at 664-65.
87. See id. at 488, 214 A.2d at 667. The court found these "uses too small on
which to place the plaintiff in the ranks of scientific institutions." Id.
88. 649 A.2d 1098 (Me. 1994). The court construed benevolent as "synonymous
with the word charitable." Id. at 1100 (citing Maine AFL-CIO Housing Dev. Corp.
v. Madawaska, 523 A.2d 581, 584 (Me. 1987)).
See also City of Lewiston v. Marcotte Congregate Hous., Inc., 673 A.2d 209 (Me.
1996). In Marcotte, the State Board of Property Tax Review had allowed Marcotte
Congregate House (MCH) an exemption from property tax, even after finding that
the nonprofit leased a portion of its building worth 18% of its value to private physi-
cians and nonsubsidized housing tenants. The Board exempted the remaining 82%
of the building's value. The Law Court denied MCH the exemption entirely by vir-
tue of the fact that the lessees were not exempt organizations and therefore the
property was not "occupied or used solely for their own purposes by one or more
other [qualifying] organizations." Id. at 212. The Marcotte decision suggests the
readiness of municipalities, as well as the Law Court, to hold nonprofit organizations
to the letter of the exemption statute. Marcotte sent shock waves through the ranks
of nonprofit organizations in Maine, and caused many of them to scrutinize their
operations for potentially for-profit activities. See, e.g. Dave Boardman, Court Rul-
ing a Tax Woe for College, TnAEs REcoRD (Brunswick, Me.), May 21, 1996 at 1 (tax
assessor considering challenge to Bowdoin College's property tax exemption for
campus building in which private travel agency rents space).
89. Town of Poland v. Poland Spring Health Inst., 649 A.2d at 1100.
90. 150 Me. 350, 354, 110 A.2d 581, 584 (1954).
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[T]here must be a careful examination to determine whether
in fact the institution is organized and conducting its operation
for purely benevolent and charitable purposes in good faith,
whether there is any profit motive revealed or concealed,
whether there is any pretense to avoid taxation, and whether
any production of revenue is purely incidental to a dominant
purpose which is benevolent and charitable. When these
questions are answered favorably to the petitioner for exemp-
tion, the property may not be taxed.9'
As the seminal case for determining qualification for exemption,
Green Acre provides a surprisingly superficial definition of what an
organization must show to be deemed charitable under the exemp-
tion statute. As in numerous other jurisdictions, "purely benevo-
lent" and "charitable purposes" are left wholly undefined. 92
This lack of a specific definition seems finally to have been at least
tentatively grappled with in the Law Court's most recent opinion on
the definition of benevolent or charitable purpose. In Episcopal
Camp Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Hope93 the Law Court provided
a test of charitable purpose that relies heavily on a quid pro quo
analysis by which the charitable institution legally merits its exempt
status if it "relieves the government" of part of its burden "[by] con-
ferring a pecuniary benefit upon the body politic.... ."I The Law
91. Town of Poland v. Poland Spring Health Inst., 649 A.d at 1100 (quoting
Green Acre Baha'i Inst. v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. at 354, 110 A2d at 584).
92. Leaving charitable largely undefined is not uncommon. See Wm/.uoRD &
GALLAGHER, supra note 9, at 127-29.
93. 666 A2d 108 (Me. 1995).
94. Id. at 110. The court described a charity as being
for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their
minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving
their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, or by assisting them to
establish themselves in life, erecting or maintaining public buildings or
works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. South Blue Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 221 A.2d at 280,287) (Me.
1966).
The characterization of charitable activities as those which assume a burden that
government could or might otherwise carry seems to have roots in the English Char-
itable Uses Act. See English Charitable Uses Act of 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng.).
Interpreting the extent of the charitable classification, which had been under criti-
cism for abuses, Lord Macnaghten in 1891 found that there were four principal pur-
poses that satisfied the legal definition of charity, as opposed to the popular
definition. The four classifications were: the relief of poverty, the advancement of
education or religion, and "for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling
under any of the preceding heads." Commissioners for Special Purposes of the In-
come Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] App. Cas. 531,580-83 (appeal taken from C.A.) (empha-
sis added).
In the closely-related realm of construing allegedly charitable testamentary trusts,
the standards applied are frequently the same (and similarly as broad) as those often
used to determine whether organizations are charitable. The Restatement of Trusts
mirrors Lord Macnaghten's statement with a similar category of "charitable trusts
for the Promotion of Other Purposes Beneficial to the Community." REsTAitmnr
1997]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Court upheld the trial court's finding that the organization's pro-
gram that integrated religious teachings, moral instruction, social
living, and civil responsibility was well within the relieving-govern-
ment-burdens requirement set out in the Johnson v. South Blue Hill
Cemetery Association definition of charitable.95
While the requirement that organizations qualify as charitable by
"lessening the burdens of government" is rather general, it provides
a more functional test of "charitable" than the prior, circular stan-
dard that property "is exempt from taxes if it is used to further the
organization's charitable purposes."'  On the other hand, by stating
that a charitable organization is merely being given a quid pro quo
for its services in providing something which otherwise the govern-
ment would have to provide, Episcopal Camp Foundation leaves
open the question of precisely what the government is obligated to
provide.
Municipalities may argue in the future that government has no
actual obligation to provide any quantum of open space, wildlife
habitat, or undeveloped land, and therefore that a conservation or-
ganization should not qualify as exempt. Such litigants are likely to
seize on language such as that cited by the dissent in Episcopal
Camp Foundation: "Implicit... in each case that presents the issue
whether an organization has been conducted exclusively for charita-
ble purposes is an evaluation of its activities to determine if they
alleviate a public need 'which otherwise the government would have
to provide.'"" This dissenting opinion would read into the charita-
ble exemption statute and precedent a stringent government obliga-
tion requirement that exemption be denied for organizations whose
services are not those that government is bound to provide. 98
Conservation interests might have difficulty countering the scru-
tiny that this dissenting view extols; nevertheless, they could cite nu-
merous legislative determinations of the critical importance of
natural resources to the state's economy and the well-being of its
citizens. For instance, in 1988 Maine voters approved a thirty-five
million dollar bond issue for acquisition of fee ownership of conser-
vation land.99 The fact that insufficient revenues prevented further
(SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 374 (1959). This section reads: "Promotion of Other Pur-
poses Beneficial to the Community. A trust for the promotion of purposes which
are of a character sufficiently beneficial to the community to justify permitting prop-
erty to be devoted forever to their accomplishment is charitable." IeL
95. See Episcopal Camp Found. v. Town of Hope, 666 A.2d at 111.
96. Town of Poland v. Poland Spring Health Inst., 649 A.2d at 1100.
97. Episcopal Camp Found., Inc. v. Town of Hope, 666 A.2d at 111 (Glassman, J.,
dissenting) (quoting YMCA of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 187 A. 204, at
210 (Pa. 1936)).
98. See id.
99. See Findings, Land for Maine's Future Fund, ME. Rlv. STAT. ArN. tit. 5,
§ 6200 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997) ("[Pjublic interest in the future quality and
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reauthorizations of the Act lends some credence to the position that
land conservation organizations-operating with the same conserva-
tion purposes as the Land for Maine's Future Board-are in fact
relieving the government of the obligation to carry out its articu-
lated policies. In Episcopal Camp Foundation terms, they are "con-
ferring a pecuniary benefit upon the body politic."1 1'° Yet short of a
constitutional or legislative statement that the state must provide
open space to its citizens, a strict application of the relieving-govern-
ment-burden test might well leave land conservation a non-exempt
activity.
The most obvious difficulty of a strict government obligation the-
ory is that the apparent obligations of government are constantly in
flux. The answer to the question of whether financial relief for the
cost of fuel during the winter is an obligation owed by government
to elderly persons changes with congressional and legislative tem-
peraments. Yet to deny exemption to a charitable organization
dedicated to providing energy to the indigent elderly merely be-
cause government is not currently obligated by law to provide such
relief would be an arbitrary standard. It carries the lessening of the
burdens of government test to an illogical extreme.
Another possible and unintended result of this type of strict inter-
pretation is that, when laws requiring government to provide goods
are repealed, the nonprofit sector is often called upon to fill the re-
sulting vacuum, a phenomenon as likely in the context of medical
benefits as in land acquisition for public use. Yet, ironically, pre-
cisely when the governmental obligation is removed by legislative
act, a strict application of the government obligation test would re-
move the nonprofit's tax-exempt status. Such a judicial interpreta-
tion is possible. In some jurisdictions certain types of exemptions
have, in fact, been allowed or disallowed by the courts based on
whether government is required to provide the service at issue.101
availability for all Maine people of lands for recreation and conservation is best
served by significant additions of lands to the public domain.").
100. Episcopal Camp Found., Inc. v. Town of Hope, 666 A.2d at 110 (quoting
Johnson v. South Blue ill Cemetery Ass'n, 221 A.2d at 287). See also M.. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 6200 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997) which provides:
The Legislature further finds that Maine's private, nonprofit organizations
... have made significant contributions to the protection of the State's
natural areas and ... should be encouraged to further expand and coordi-
nate their efforts by working with state agencies as "cooperating entities"
in order to help acquire, pay for and manage new state acquisitions of high
priority natural lands.
Id.
101. Although now overruled, the opinion in Brattleboro Child Development Ina
v. Town of Brattleboro, 416 A.2d 152 (Vt. 1980) conceded that the day care facility's
services were beneficial to the general public but nonetheless denied it property tax
exemption in the classification of land used for public uses or schooling. The court
stated. "[Tlhe particular function of child day care is not now recognized as an obli-
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A final and not unimportant legal test for tax-exempt status that
the Maine Law Court has now implicitly recognized is whether the
organization's members and other donors provide the bulk of its
revenues."°2 Episcopal Camp Foundation found the fact that the
charity could not operate without substantial donations an indica-
tion of charitable status." a This legal rationale is consistent with the
economic theory posited in Part II-that nonprofit organizations are
private market providers of public goods supported by at least a
modicum of financial donations, and enjoyed by both patrons and
free riders." 4 The exemption of conservation land in general meets
this requirement. The land is obtained and purchased in the typical
case by a local or regional land trust which has raised most of the
funds through donations from its members and local citizens.
State statute and common law have evolved tests which consider,
at least in broad terms, the costs and benefits of nonprofit activity to
society as a whole. Judicial decisions on exemptions for charitable
organizations interpret statutes rationally and are supported by ac-
cepted social and economic theory. Therefore, to the extent that
inequities persist at the local level, their resolution may lie in legisla-
tively enacted mechanisms. The balance of this Comment discusses
the prospects of such mechanisms, existing and potential, and ana-
lyzes current use taxation as the conservation organization's other
option for reducing, though not eliminating, taxes on the lands it
conserves in the public interest.
gatory municipal service in this state. [The day care facility] does not, therefore,
assume a burden of the municipality to provide a service which the legislature has
determined to be an essential governmental function." Id. at 155. The decision was
overruled in American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 557 A.2d
900 (Vt. 1989).
See also discussion infra Part V. In the specific realm of hospital tax exemptions,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set higher standards that hospitals must meet:
they must advance a charitable purpose, donate a substantial portion of their serv-
ices, benefit a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are subjects of charity,
relieve the government of some of its burden, and not operate with a profit motive.
See Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985).
102. See Episcopal Camp Found., Inc. v. Town of Hope, 666 A.2d at 111 (citing
City of Bangor v. Rising Virtue Lodge No. 10, 73 Me. 428, 434 (1882)).
103. See id.
104. Precisely the same rationale has been applied to tort law immunity for non-
profits under common law principles for charitable organizations; immunity may be
abrogated when most of an organization's funds come from fees as opposed to dona-
tions, or negligence occurs in the course of activities that are primarily commercial
in nature. See Child v. Central Maine Med. Ctr., 575 A.2d 318,319 (Me. 1990) ("an
organization... which receives and administers virtually no charitable gifts or dona-
tions is not entitled to immunity from liability for its torts"). See also Janet Fairchild,
Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities-Modern Status, 25
A.L.R. 4mH 517, 558-59 (1983); 15 AM. JuR. 2D Charities § 211 (1976).
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IV. CORRECrING THE OVERDEPENDENCE ON THE
PROPERTY TAX
The New England states are above the national norm for the per-
centage of local revenues attributable to property tax, and at ap-
proximately fifty percent, Maine is well above it."os Even at much
lower levels, the property tax generates high levels of citizen in-
volvement and nearly universal unpopularity.10 6 At levels as high as
Maine's, a state becomes susceptible to political pressures effecting
radical changes in the tax structure."0 7 If the legislature does not
satisfy the demands of the electorate, citizen referendum or initia-
tive will."~s The heart of such measures is often a limit on the total
property tax rate to a given percentage of the property's full cash
value, a requirement for a super-majority to enact new taxes or
override the limitation imposed by the statute, and a reimbursement
requirement for state-imposed municipal services. 109
While the degree of success of property tax limitations is debated,
it is fair to characterize them as last resorts, prompted by a failure of
legislatures to craft solutions to an excessive dependence on the
property tax.110 Absent this dependence, the property tax has been
recognized as an efficient means for local governments to provide a
level of services that local residents are willing to support through
taxation. In theory, citizens will move to municipalities that provide
the services they desire at a tax cost that they can afford."' An
105. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 11.
106. See Mields, Jr., supra note 6, at 17 (unpopularity of property tax is exceeded
only by that of the income tax.)
107. The overreliance on the property tax is no secret to the Maine legislature.
See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5681(1)(B) (West 1996) ("To stabilize the mu-
nicipal property tax burden and to aid in financing all municipal services, it is neces-
sary to provide funds from the broad-based taxes of State Government.").
108. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts Propo-
sition 21h).
109. See generally ARLo WOOL.RY, PROP'm-y TAX PR cnipLES AND PRA CnCE
69-76 (1989). The California Proposition 13 initiative amended the state constitution
to: (1) limit the ad valorem tax on real property to one percent of full cash value, (2)
freeze property values as of March 1, 1975, or as of the date property changes own-
ership or is newly constructed, (3) limit annual adjustments for inflation to two per-
cent for any one year, (4) bar state and local governments from imposing new ad
valorem taxes on real property or on its sale, and (5) require a two-thirds vote of the
legislature for new or increased taxes and a two-thirds vote of the electorate to in-
crease or add new local taxes. See id. at 71-72.
110. See WOOLERY, supra note 109, at 69-70.
111. See id. The Tiebout model is the pioneering theoretical construct describing
the phenomenon. See Charles liebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditurer, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956) reprinted in Gnxarm, supra note 6, at 377, 378 ("Given
Ilocal government] revenue and expenditure patterns, the consumer-voter moves to
that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences."). But
cf. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Uncon-
stitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L Rnv. 473, 514-18 (1991) (questioning
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excessive dependence on the property tax, however, would seem to
skew the relationship: those who own property perceive that they
are being overburdened by those who do not own property, the free
rider phenomenon 12 is accentuated, and property owners are likely
to be induced to organize at the state level behind some form of tax
cap legislation."1 3
The tax cap referendum recently proposed in Maine"1 4 is similarly
symptomatic of the overreliance on the property tax. But opposi-
tion to the proposed Maine referendum by coalitions of businesses,
schools, and municipal leaders suggests that unnecessary limitations
on local government could be avoided if legislatures would facilitate
other funding sources for municipalities.115 Legislatures might also
help prevent the perceived overvaluations in real estate caused by
inflated land values by numerous mechanisms.11 6
whether citizens actually have ample choice of communities in which to live and
whether levels of taxation and public service are critical factors).
112. See GLL , supra note 6, at 39 (describing actors who "can obtain a bene-
fit without making any contribution toward its creation as long as someone else is
willing to produce the benefit").
113. Commentators have noted that the iebout model breaks down where dis-
satisfied citizens can neither exit their community nor effect change locally. At such
a juncture they "may find it easier to coalesce at the state level.... [T]he state is the
forum for those who are excluded from the local decision-making process." Gi.-
LEr, supra note 6, at 508. Recourse to either state legislation or to referenda for
property tax exemption reform has not seemed to have reached the critical mass
apparent in successful tax reform measures in general.
114. The proposed Maine ballot question reads: "Do you want to change Maine
law to limit property taxes to 1 percent of the full cash value of the property?"
Citizen initiative filed with Maine Attorney General, Jan. 29, 1996. Opponents
claimed that the one percent limit would have reduced local property tax revenues
by 41%, or $428 million statewide, and that Portland would have lost $31 million of
its $77 million in property taxes. See Maine Citizens for Responsible Government,
Fact Sheet, Feb. 6, 1996; Steven G. Vegh, Opponents: Tax Cap Threatens Town, Cit-
ies, PoirTLNr PRiss HERALD, Jan. 31, 1996, at 4B.
The tax cap proposal was rejected by Maine Secretary of State Bill Diamond on
February 16, 1996, for lack of sufficient valid signatures. See Francis X. Quinn, Dia-
mond Rejects Tax-cap Initiative, PoRTLAND PREss HERALD, Feb. 17, 1996, at 1A. It
should be noted that the constitutionality of tax cap measures need not be an issue if
the legislation is carefully drafted---California's Proposition 13 easily survived an
equal protection challenge in the eight to one United States Supreme Court ruling in
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), which held that California's acquisition-value
taxation system benefiting longer-term property owners at the expense of newer
owners had rational basis, created no suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny,
and posed no threat to any fundamental interest.
115. Vegh, supra note 114, at 4B.
116. For example, legislation could allow a landowner to make an election for a
five-year moving average of taxable values as a basis for the current year's property
taxes. See WOOLERY, supra note 109, at 28-29. This method would provide the
revenue stability during periods of inflation and deflation which has long been
hailed as the primary virtue of the property tax for municipalities. At the same time,
it would save taxpayers from the type of unpredictable assessments that generate
emotional attacks on the property tax in the first place. See id.
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Citizen-initiated tax limits should not be dismissed out of hand.
Proponents cite numerous benefits, including increased state fund-
ing for local government services and public education. 17 Propo-
nents of citizen-initiated tax limits also claim that the strict limits on
the percentage of local valuation that may be placed on the property
tax under California's Proposition 13, for example, did not result in
many substantive reductions in local government services.11 The
indisputably reduced revenues 9 have arguably been made up by
state aid, and the State of California has assumed primary responsi-
bility for public school financing.'
The Maine initiative had the apparent potential to hamstring
many local government operations. Ironically, an ensuing beneficial
effect of such a measure would likely be to build political support
for other revenue sources to complement the property tax, while at
the same time rendering tax exemption less of a target. Perhaps the
best solution, then, would blend a careful reduction of dependence
117. See id. at 97.
118. See id
119. Property tax levies in California declined 52.2% in 1979. See i at 73.
120. See i Massachusetts enacted a similar measure in 1980, Proposition 21h,
limiting the total property tax rate to 2%% of full and fair cash value of taxable
property. See i at 74. It also required any jurisdiction with a tax rate over 21h% to
lower its rate to 2 %, and limited annual increases to 21h%. See UL At the same
time, the state was required to reimburse municipalities for state-mandated expendi-
tures, and allowed for local override of Proposition 21h provisions only by a tvo-
thirds majority vote. See id
The "outstanding success" attributed by many to the resulting reductions in the
growth of local government, see Woo.RuY, supra note 109, at 75, deserves critical
examination, because the economic prosperity in the decade after its enactment ap-
pears to have been a short-lived boom. Elsewhere, Woolery worries that Proposi-
tion 13, for example, has precluded the possibility of the property tax to respond to
valid revenue needs in the face of a declining value base. See WooLERY, supra note
109, at 28.
Tax cap legislation may also include mechanisms to limit annual rate increases, as
opposed to percentage limits on total local valuation. This is preferable because
percentage limits on total local valuation can be crippling during recessionary peri-
ods when land values drop. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 12.
States or municipalities can place limits on the following: (1) the total amount of
property taxes collected by the jurisdiction, (2) the total revenue available to the
jurisdiction, or (3) the total revenue that can be raised by property taxes. See
WooLERY, supra note 109, at 70. There are three less direct mechanisms: (1) limits
on the amount a jurisdiction can spend each year, (2) limits on the amount the juris-
diction's spending can increase each year, or (3) limits based on a fixed percentage
of an economic indicator such as personal income or the rate of inflation. See I at
71.
"TRuth in taxation" legislation is another strategy by which local assessors are re-
quired to inform taxpayers of how much the local tax rate would have to be reduced
in order to produce tax revenues the same as the prior year. See Id The goal of
such disclosure laws is to prevent public officials from increasing spending without
first engaging in public discourse. See i
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on the property tax with complementary modifications in exemption
law.
A. Diversifying the Tax Base
Political support is thought to be the prerequisite to any effective
property tax reform.1 21 Conventional wisdom suggests that there is
a certain measure of political safety in keeping residential property
taxes at the lowest level possible consistent with the revenue needs
of a taxing jurisdiction."z The solutions examined below would
tend to cause property to be taxed at lower levels and thus should
enhance the political capital of their legislative proponents.
In the wake of Proposition 13, California localities resorted to
user fees, exactions, and leaseback arrangements, which generally
were sustained by the state supreme court even when the locality
did not obtain the two-thirds popular majority required for new
taxes."z Local officials also sought voter support, with limited suc-
cess, for special purpose taxes for libraries, transit, and fire and po-
lice protection." Commentators cite both the aggregate amount of
taxation and the distribution of the tax burden as motivating factors
in tax reform."z This suggests that neither diversifying taxes nor
reducing the property tax alone is certain to solve popular unrest
with the overall tax structure. Both strategies are necessary. 26
B. Local Option Taxes
While property taxes make up an above-average percentage of
total state revenues in Maine, the dependence on the property tax at
the local level is even more stark. At 98.6%, Maine is one of the top
five states in the country in a ranking of property taxes as a percent-
121. See WOOLERY, supra note 109, at 31 ("Could it be that [the property tax]
offers greater political opportunity to more politicians at more levels of government
than any other tax ever devised?"). See also JANE MALME, PREFERENTAL PROP-
ERTY TAX TREATMENT OF LAND 8 (1993) ("There is general agreement that a diver-
sified revenue system is desirable, with a balance of funding from taxes on income,
consumption and wealth so that tax rates on each object of taxation may be kept at a
reasonably low level.").
122. See WOOLERY, supra note 109, at 38 ("Policy makers... tailor their distribu-
tion of property tax burdens to obtain maximum political advantage with minimal
political damage.").
123. See DAVID 0. SEARS, TAX REVOLT 245 (1993).
124. See id. at 245-46.
125. See id at 4-5.
126. The difficulty of singling out the causes for citizen discontent is further evi-
denced by surveys about Proposition 13 in California, which show that the taxpayer
whose main complaint was the property tax was likely to support limits on the state
income tax as well. See iU at 4-7. Commentators then explain the tax revolt as a
public protest of overall government spending, but they too are contradicted by
surveys that consistently show the public desire to maintain the level of government
service. See id
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age of total municipal taxes. 27 This is well above the national aver-
age of 75.7% and a universe above the opposite end of the
spectrum, in Louisiana and Alabama, where local property taxes
contribute 41% and 36%, respectively.' - In addition to significant
variance among the states, percentages within states vary even more
widely, with some major cities relying on the local property tax for
only approximately one-tenth of their total tax revenues.'" A com-
mon factor allowing low local property tax rates are state statutes
permitting local alternative taxes on sales and income.130
Reducing the dependence on local property tax, and thus easing
the hostility toward exemptions granted for socially beneficial uses
could, in part, be achieved by the creation of local option taxes on
meals, accommodations, or sales. Critics have concerns that such
taxes are regressive in that they are proportional and thus tend to
exact a higher percentage of total income from poorer than from
wealthier families. 1  Yet the exclusion of groceries, medicine, and
other necessities-as well as the expected tendency for wealthier
families to purchase more discretionary items-should cause
wealthier families to pay a higher percentage of the total sales tax
than would lower-income families.' 32
No municipality in the State of Maine currently imposes local
sales or use taxes. 3  Some states have constitutional provisions
granting municipalities this capability as part of their home rule
power."M Florida provides an example of the mix of local taxes that
127. See Dearborn, supra note 2, at 11 (citation omitted).
128. See id
129. St. Louis and Columbus rank lowest at 12.5% and 8.5%, respectively. See
id at 12 (citing PHiP IM. DnABORN E'T At., City Finances in the 1990s (1992)).
130. See id. at 11; see also Gary C. Cornia, State and Local Revenues, 1978.88, in
A LOOK AT STATE AND LocAL TAX Poucmrs 3,17 (Frederick D. Stocker, ed., 1991)
(citing data that show growing importance of local sales tax, largely on account of its
"acceptability and productivity").
131. See WooLERY, supra note 109, at 41. Voters may share these concerns.
Michigan voters in 1993 defeated a referendum that would have allowed a 50% in-
crease in sales tax in return for a cap on local property tax and a guaranteed mini-
mum in state per capita school aid. In the same year a similar proposal in Montana
lost overwhelmingly. See Mields, supra note 6, at 17. See also Harold Hovey, State
and Local Tax Issues in the 1990s, in A LOOK AT STATE Am LOCAl. TAX PoLucyES,
supra note 130, at 67.
132. See WOOLERY, supra note 109, at 41.
133. See Severin M. Beliveau & Michael L. Sheehan, Maine Sales & Use Taxes, in
ABA SALs AND USE TAX DESK Boor,, 1994-95 ed., at 20-4 (D. Michael Young &
John T. Piper eds., 1994).
134. For example, "Colorado home rule cities enjoy plenary constitutional au-
thority over the imposition, collection and uses of local sales taxes." John E. Hayes
& Paul D. Godec, Taxation Innovations: Enhanced Sales Tax Incentive Programs, 22
URB. LAw. 143, 156 (1990). Hayes and Godec present a strong case for a further
extension of local option taxes called "Enhanced Sales Tax Incentive Programs"
[hereinafter ESTIP], which they believe to be superior to conventional tax incre-
ment financing. See id. at 157. An ESTIP entices local retailers to invest in im-
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can diversify revenue sources and lessen pressure on the property
tax. In the face of curbs on state monies and increasing demands for
services at the local level, Florida implemented local discretionary
sales surtaxes (including a local government infrastructure sur-
tax),135 local option gas taxes,136 a local occupational license tax,'137
and a municipal revenue-sharing program.138
Neither the Maine Constitution nor state statute makes any men-
tion of the taxing powers of municipalities save for property taxes
and local license taxes.139 However, the justices of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court have given their opinion that it would be
constitutional for the legislature to allow a city to impose a one per-
cent gross receipts tax without concurrently providing the same
power to all other municipalities. 140 Because it is an open question
as to whether such taxes are authorized under state law, the Maine
Legislature would likely be the place for a local option tax to be
legitimized. Enabling legislation could give cities and towns the
ability to add a one-half or one percent tax, for example, on
purchases in designated categories.
provements that are both public in nature and in proximity to their businesses, by
guaranteeing the participating retailers a share in an agreed upon percentage of the
incremental increase in municipal sales taxes received from the time the retailer
completes the improvement until an agreed upon future date. See id. at 143-44.
Conceptually, the scheme benefits both businesses and the municipality. The re-
tailers stand to increase their sales while making valuable improvements at a re-
duced cost. The municipality benefits by an expanded tax base, expanded tax
revenues, and public improvements at no public cost. See id. at 157. ESTIPs offer
the additional advantage of requiring no bond issues as do conventional tax incre-
ment financing schemes. See iL
135. See Mary Kay Falconer et al., Local Government Revenues Post 1993 Legis-
lative Session: A Combination of New and Improved, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 585,
589-94 (1993). By Florida statute, one-half of one percent or one percent may be set
as the local surtax on all taxable transactions, if approved through a local referen-
dum. See id. at 589-90. The use of the tax proceeds was originally limited to financ-
ing, planning, and constructing infrastructure, but is now allowed for the closing of
municipal or county-owned landfills and the purchase of emergency vehicles. See Id.
at 590-91, 593. Municipalities may also share the proceeds with school boards or use
the funds to acquire land for public recreation, conservation, or for the protection of
natural resources. See id. at 591.
136. Nearly all counties in Florida levy the legislatively authorized motor fuel
surtax of one to six cents. See id. at 594-95 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 336.021(1)
(West 1991 & Supp. 1997)). The county tax may be approved by majority vote of
the governing body or by referendum, and inter-local agreements can be made for
allocation of funds to municipalities. See id. at 594, 596. Maine's gasoline tax is
state-imposed. Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2903 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997).
137. Under Florida law, municipalities can assess a local occupational license tax
for the express purpose of raising general revenue for local government, separate
and distinct from license fees, which are essentially limited to covering the cost of
regulating the particular type of business. See Falconer, supra note 135, at 601-02.
138. See id. at 613-16.
139. See [Me.] All St. Tax Rep. (CCH), supra note 67, 72-001.
140. Opinion of the Justices, 159 Me. 420, 424-27, 191 A.2d 627, 630-32 (1963).
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The foregoing ideas are aimed at reducing reliance on the prop-
erty tax but do not independently solve the inequities of property
tax exemption in Maine. They are significant in that they can and
should be part of a several-prong strategy to improve a system that
is not fully in balance.
V. How MucH OF AN EXEMPTION is FAIR? DEVISING A
1McHANIsM TO COUNTR LocAL INEQuriEs
Chief among the deficiencies of the local property tax system is its
tendency to exacerbate tensions between the state and its municipal-
ities. Broad categories of exemption-legacies from the nineteenth
century-remain codified despite legislatures' limited awareness of
how exemptions will be distributed geographically in a state. States
grant the property tax exemption in broad categories without an un-
derstanding of who will bear the burden of the subsidy. While ex-
emption is created at the state level, the fiscal impact is most acutely
felt at the local level by the shift of tax burden to other, non-exempt
properties. The ensuing disagreements between the municipality
and the nonprofit are either litigated in court, or some type of agree-
ment is negotiated. Maine charitable exemption law would be
greatly improved if it could somehow gauge the costs and benefits of
the various exempt entities, and establish clearer standards for ex-
empt status.''
A A New Tax Exemption Statute for Maine
As discussed in Part II, a government's first available means of
ensuring the fairness of exemptions is in legislatively defined re-
quirements for classification as tax exempt. While most states have
broad definitions for the charitable purpose required for exemp-
tion,'42 some states have adopted tests that seek to measure the
value of the charitable activity to society. These either require that
the organization's activities relieve a burden of the government or,
more commonly, that the activity be one that the government has
the power to undertake.' One criterion in New Mexico case law,
for example, is whether the organization relieves a government ex-
penditure commensurate with the loss of tax revenue.'4
141. As a solution to the state-local conflict, one public official has proposed "a
tripartite group including state officials, local officials, and dispassionate third par-
ties ... to consider each tax exemption request rather than have the decision lie with
the state solely." Memorandum from Harry H. Dresser, Jr., Selectman, Town of
Bethel, Maine (on fie with the Maine Law Review).
142. See generally W..roxm & GALLAGHER, supra note 9, at 125-38.
143. See id at 127-28.
144. See id. at 130 (citing Mountain View Homes, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 427
P.2d 13, 17 (N.M. 1967)).
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Similarly, Vermont organizations seeking exempt status for public
uses were formerly required to provide a service that the govern-
ment is required to provide. Decisions denied exemption, for in-
stance, to a day care center, because the state was not required to
provide day care, 45 and a school that taught English to foreign citi-
zeus similarly failed because the state has no duty to provide that
service. 46 Where the state had an obligation to educate blind chil-
dren, however, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled a camp for the
blind exempt. 47 These decisions were eventually overruled; instead
of requiring the exempt organization to provide an "essential gov-
ernmental function," the Vermont Supreme Court now interprets
the exemption statute in a more liberal fashion.'"
As discussed in Part III, Maine has a rational exemption statute
which is interpreted by the Maine Law Court consistently with the
statutory language and with the generally accepted societal justifica-
tions for exemption to nonprofits that provide public services that
the government should or could provide. However, the statutory
language is not greatly changed from the 1840s, when the nonprofit
presence in many towns was likely limited to the church and the
library.' 49 Legislators could not envision today's proliferation of
nonprofits, some of which have large staffs and payrolls. If a critical
mass of property tax payers, town officials, and voters demand an
even greater accounting of the purported benefits of property tax
exemption, the legislature could set a higher standard.
B. Legislative Scrutiny of Exemptions and Other
Tax Expenditures
Officially, the Maine Legislature has recognized that "tax expend-
itures constitute a permanent reduction in tax revenues of the State
and result in an increased tax burden on taxpayers who are not ben-
efited."' 50 "Tax expenditures" are defined as "provisions of state
law which result in a reduction of tax revenue due to special exclu-
sions, exemptions, deductions, credits, preferential rates or deferral
145. See Brattleboro Child Dev., Inc. v. Town of Brattleboro, 416 A.2d 152, 155
(Vt. 1980).
146. See English Language Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Wallingford, 318 A.2d 180, 182-
83 (Vt. 1974).
147. See New York Inst. for the Educ. of the Blind v. Town of Wolcott, 262 A.2d
451, 455 (Vt. 1970).
148. See American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 557 A.2d
900, 904-05 (Vt. 1989) ("[W]hile properties which actually provide essential govern-
mental functions may be exempt as a public use, we no longer will require a prop-
erty to assume such a burden in order to achieve tax-exempt status."); accord
Kingsland Bay Sch., Inc. v. Town of Middlebury, 569 A.2d 496 (Vt. 1989).
149. See DAVID WImy, UNIvEsrrY oF MAINE, INsTrrruiONAL PROPERTY TAX
ExEMP17IONS IN MAINE 19-24 (1975) (describing a steady growth in exempt property
from the colonial era to the 1970s).
150. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 195 (West 1990).
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of tax liability."'' Consistent with these concerns, the Maine stat-
ute calls on a legislative committee to review tax expenditures in a
number of categories every four years."5~
But in practice the overall scrutiny of tax exemptions is limited.
In fact, the statute that exempts charitable and benevolent as well as
literary and scientific organizations is not among the tax expendi-
tures scheduled for periodic review.' 3 This review should occur
regularly, at the very least to ensure that legislators can begin to
discuss the sharing of costs and benefits, and address the areas
where the courts have lacked guidance. For example, a needed dis-
cussion is whether to add a specifically defined relieving-public-bur-
den test to the exemption statute, rather than leaving it up to the
courts that created the test in the first place.
C. State Compensation for Exemption
If state policy exempts property from taxation to the detriment of
local taxpayers and to the general benefit of the commonwealth, a
logical theoretical solution is for the state to compensate municipali-
ties for the loss to the extent external benefits exceed local benefits.
If the state legislature agrees that the state should bear some burden
of local exemptions, the question becomes how to determine the
state share. If an exempt organization's local activities provide ben-
efits equal to or greater than the cost of municipal services provided
to the organization, the state subsidy should arguably be zero. Con-
versely, to the extent that the benefits provided by the organization
are largely enjoyed by non-local persons, the argument that the state
should bear the burden of compensation is stronger. The great chal-
lenge in devising an equitable system in the latter situation would be
151. Id. § 196 (emphasis added). Although questioning its legality and claiming
the proposition is "typically presented for rhetorical effect," some commentators
have called for a system by which legislatures distribute cash grants to nonprofits
instead of exemptions. See Rosner, supra note 14, at 107. Such a system would have
the appeal of subjecting the nonprofit property use to periodic scrutiny like other
expenditures of public monies, and "would probably serve to constrain the generos-
ity of the legislature ...." Id.
In stating the case for the status quo, Rosner reveals the political dynamic at the
heart of any attempted reform of the exemption statutes:
[E]xemptions are preferred over cash grants because they insulate exempt
organizations from state interference and control, free them from the va-
garies of periodic legislative review.., and most importantly, avoid the
need for each organization to reveal its property wealth and justify its sub-
idy.... [S]ome affluent organizations would fare considerably less well in
the expenditure process than they have with exemptions.
Id.
152. See Mr. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 198 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997).
153. See id § 652(1)(A), (3).
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determining the proportion of the exemption that the state as a
whole should bear."5
Legislatures in a number of states have created mechanisms for
limiting the extent to which the state can create new exempt prop-
erty without compensating the town for loss of tax revenue. Maine,
for instance, adopted a constitutional provision requiring the Legis-
lature to reimburse each municipality for at least fifty percent of the
property tax revenue lost as a result of new categories of property
tax exemptions or credits enacted after April 1, 1978.155
Unfortunately, while such legislation may protect the local fisc in
the future and does show the important awareness of excesses in
exemption policy, practically speaking it fails to compensate towns
for categories of exemptions granted prior to the constitutional en-
actment. These exemptions constitute the bulk of exempt proper-
ties. Since new exempt properties are largely based on exemption
categories created prior to 1978, little relief is provided by the state
constitution. And, as is often the case, exemption categories that
would appear to be new may be creatively classified under catego-
ries existing prior to 1978, and legislatures will inevitably phrase
such exemptions so as to escape constitutional compensation
requirements. 156
Political inertia would likely resist a legislative attempt to apply
the fifty percent reimbursement requirement to exemption catego-
ries that existed before 1978.117 Nonetheless, this strategy has its
proponents 158 who argue, for example, that "[t]he cost of exempting
these institutions because of their social value would thus be spread
across the state rather than being bore... by the communities in
which they are physically located .... ,159 A significant, beneficial
154. See Rudnick, supra note 30, at 341 ("[Tlhe local government should remain
responsible for that proportion of the exemption that benefits local citizens.").
155. Mn. Corsr. art. IV, pt. 3, § 23.
156. See, e.g., Mn. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 458 (West 1990) ("continuation of
exemption" of telecommunications personal property) ("It is the intent of the Legis-
lature that this section not be considered a new property tax exemption requiring
state reimbursement under the Constitution of Maine .. ").
157. Another problematic issue is the difficulty of valuation for the bulk of ex-
empt properties-notably colleges, churches, private schools, and hospitals, not to
mention government properties. See OrA N & ScHoEr_, supra note 24, at 344
(referring to analysis by a noted tax expert claiming that "nothing but trouble" can
result from attempted valuations of types of properties rarely sold on the market).
158. Municipal assessors have discussed a proposal by which all tax exempt
properties would lose their exemptions at five percent per year, providing adequate
time, effectively twenty years, to adjust. At the same time, a ceiling would be set
such that the entity's tax would never exceed a standardized percentage of full valu-
ation. Telephone Interview with Charles Lane, Esq., Portland City Attorney (June
11, 1996).
159. ODmAN & ScHorEn, supra note 24, at 332. Proponents of state compen-
sation for exemption concede the importance of "not only the value [of the prop-
erty] to the community of the function performed by the institution, but also the
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side effect would be to maintain more accurate valuations of tax-
exempt property by local assessors, because the opportunity for
state-subsidized compensation to the municipality would provide an
incentive for more frequent revaluation."6
States have successfully compensated municipalities for revenue
loss due to exemption. In Connecticut, for example, the state makes
in-lieu-of-tax payments for the exempt property of both nonprofit
hospitals and private nonprofit institutions of higher education,
computed at sixty percent of what the local property tax would be if
the property were taxable.' 61 With an appropriation of ten million
dollars per annum, Connecticut's legislation to compensate exemp-
tion tax losses grew out of an existing system for compensating mu-
nicipalities for the tax lost from exempt state-owned urban facilities,
and was seen as a means of lessening strife between institutions and
local government.162
State compensation for exemption would be a meaningful method
of shifting the burden of exemption from local taxpayers to citizens
throughout the state. If perceived inequities at the local level rise
above a critical threshold, the legislative process, perhaps following
the Connecticut model, is available to redistribute the tax burden. If
these inequities are as large as some suggest, support of nonprofit
activities by the state budget not only may further fairness, but may
temper reliance upon imprudent or radical tax reform efforts.
D. Exemption of Government Property
At thirty-three percent, United States government property is by
far the largest category of exempt valuation in the state of Maine.163
A more detailed analysis is necessary to determine the extent to
which government property at state and local levels requires signifi-
effect which that value has on the taxable valuation of other property in the neigh-
borhood or in the community as a whole." Id
160. See LENAmsON & BLAISD.EL, supra note 43, at 9 (suggesting revaluation of
tax exempt property no less frequently than at five-year intervals).
161. See Rosner, supra note 14, at 105-06 (describing CorN. GmN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-20a to 12-12b) (Vest 1993 & Supp. 1996)). The compensation is available to
the extent of the legislative appropriation in any given year. See 14
162. See id at 105. New Jersey and Wisconsin also compensate municipalities for
state exempt property. See id
163. See LENARDSON & BLAISDELI, supra note 43, at 5. In some western states,
government property occupies as much as 85% of the state's land area. See Woo.
Eny, supra note 109, at 64. Military acquisitions can radically alter the tax structure
of the municipality in which they are located. Government land holdings also affect
neighboring municipalities, such as where metropolitan aqueducts and reservoirs lo-
cated outside a city provide benefits solely to the city while keeping land off of the
local tax rolls. See OLu. &1 & ScHo=r.F, supra note 24, at 324; see also ME. Rsv.
STAT. ANN. tit 36, § 651(1)(E) (West 1990) (exempting, for example, pipes, fixtures,
dams, and reservoirs of public municipal corporations supplying water, power, or
light and located outside of the limits of the municipal corporation).
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cant services incommensurate with local benefits. There is little
doubt that government property, especially in urban centers, which
tend to provide many government services, is in large part responsi-
ble for a shrinking of the tax base at the expense of local citizens. 164
Unfortunately, removal of the government property exemption ap-
pears to be a clear violation of the recognized illogic of taxing the
sovereign, which is in itself supported by taxes.165 It is also unclear
whether taxing the government provides any better answer to the
question of how tax burdens could be most fairly distributed.' 66
Assuming a state has the authority to tax a given federal prop-
erty, 67 one might question whether the federal income taxes of the
California taxpayer should abate the local property taxes of the eld-
erly in Portland, Maine. On the other hand, the notion has prece-
dent: The federal government recognizes the demands it puts on
school districts near its military bases and provides some relief in
lieu of taxes." This example suggests a congressional recognition
of the general proposition that local taxpayers should be spared
from inordinate burdens of taxation due to activities that largely
benefit the national interest. Although the Maine Legislature has
no realistic control of federal reimbursement policy, states that per-
ceive that local tax burdens due to the presence of particular federal
agencies or activities are excessive may find a common interest and
coalesce at a national level.
E. User or Service Fees
One remedy for lessening the burden that exempt entities place
on municipalities is the use of various types of charges imposed in
164. See WOOLERY, supra note 109, at 64-65 (also noting that the poor and the
elderly often feel the effects of the shrinking tax base most acutely).
165. See id. at 64. Taxing the state also adds another administrative layer, with
some loss of efficiency. See id.
166. Woolery draws a distinction between tax fairness, which is legislatively de-
fined through the tax law, and tax equity, which is achieved through good adminis-
tration of that law. See id. at 43. In the exemption arena there is an area of overlap
between tax fairness and tax equity, especially where valuation is concerned, be-
cause exempt properties are typically not appraised frequently or accurately. See
Rudnick, supra note 30, at 349. Legislation that attempts to assess various types of
charges against exempt properties on the basis of valuation thus implicates both
equity and fairness issues.
167. No state has the right to tax the United States absent congressional author-
ity. See [Me.] All St. Tax Rep. (CCH), supra note 67, 20-024.01. The language of
the statute creating a particular corporation or agency must be examined to deter-
mine whether the entity is subject to state and local taxation. See I. 1 20-204.20.
168. According to the Teasury Department, up to two billion dollars is spent
annually through "a complex of 57 ad hoc federal programs." Rosner, supra note
14, at 109 n.2 (citation omitted). See 20 U.S.C. § 7702 (1994) (providing for compen-
sation to local school districts where federal lands exceed ten percent of local as-
sessed values).
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lieu of taxes. 69 Beyond purely voluntary in-lieu payments, a user or
service fee system can allow municipalities to impose fees commen-
surate with services provided to exempt properties. Authorities dis-
agree as to which services should be part of a fair cost recovery
system-an uncertainty which is reflected in the lack of consistent
labeling of the varying types of fee systems. 7 ° In apparent response
to increasing use of such fees, the nonprofit sector has urged a dis-
tinction between user fees assessed for the actual charges incurred
for discrete amounts of water, sewer, and waste disposal used, and
service fees assessed for the exempt property's purported share in
generally provided municipal services such as police and fire protec-
tion and road maintenance. 171
User fees-for services that can be readily measured, that the ex-
empt organization consumes, and the use of which it can control-
appear to be accepted by some nonprofit advocates, provided that
they are not applied only to recapture revenue allegedly lost
through valid tax exemptions.'" If all users--exempt and non-ex-
empt alike-pay for the discrete units they consume, the user fee
theory is not discriminatory. Such an approach is further supported
by the economic argument that consumers will minimize waste of
resources for which they must pay, as long as the usage is measura-
ble. H. William Batt has aptly characterized the distinction between
these user fees and service fees, and draws a reasonable test for de-
termining which publicly provided goods and services are appropri-
ate for charging all properties at the point of consumption:
Goods and services that are substantially public in their nature
are best financed by general, broad-based taxes-taxes that
should be evaluated according to ability to pay. User fees,
however, are best used to support the provision of goods and
services that are in good part private in their character but
that, for whatever reason, are provided by government rather
than the private-sector economy.173
Legislative efforts to introduce fee systems for police, fire, and
emergency medical services have been made in Maine and else-
where,174 but this Author has found no successful current model in
active use. For example, Maine's service fee statute is seldom in-
169. Many nonprofit organizations provide payments in lieu of taxes on a volun-
tary basis, but the limitations, from the municipal point of view, of leaving the option
of making such payments to the exempt organization are apparent.
170. See Rudnick, supra note 30, at 342-50 (discussing several fee systems for
government services to exempt properties).
171. See U at 342. Perhaps a clearer terminology would be "usage" fees instead
of "user" fees.
172. See id
173. H. William Batt, User Fees: The Nontax Revenue Afternative, 1993 STATE
TAX NoTmS 787, 788.
174. See Rudnick, supra note 30, at 345, 349.
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voked.175 The successful system would have to meet a number of
challenges. It would have to find an accurate means of measuring
the value of the exempt entity's services to both the municipality
and to residents of the state. The system would need not only to
measure the cost of benefits provided to the nonprofit but also to
agree on what assessments are fair for government to assess against
a fellow service provider. 76 If the fee formula were to be based on
valuation, assessments would have to be made frequently and accu-
rately, which exempt properties as a rule are not. In short, such a
system would be a formidable challenge to implement.'"
F. User or Service Fees in Maine
A proposal recently considered by Maine lawmakers would allow
municipalities an option of assessing such service fees on otherwise
exempt, improved properties which produce revenues. 178 The fees
would be limited to 1.5% of the tax entity's annual receipts from
services provided at the property or 25% of the amount that would
have been assessed as taxes on the property if it were not exempt. 79
This resembles a tax on the business income of a nonprofit, analo-
gous to the federal tax on the unrelated business income of
nonprofits. 80
While the proposed legislation's focus on improved, revenue-pro-
ducing property would tend to remove most nonprofit conservation
land from the ambit of the service charges, it is still significant to
conservation organizations because it gives municipalities a means
to recoup a reasonable degree of revenues from the other types of
nonprofit organizations that do make greater direct use of govern-
ment services. This recourse in some municipalities might make the
land conservation organization a less likely target of broad-based
animosity toward exemption, and has the potential advantage of of-
fering a rational framework that can open a public discourse on the
costs and benefits of exempt property.
The proposal is arguably inequitable, however, because it relies
on the exempt property's valuation as the prime determinant of the
175. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(1)(L) (West 1990).
176. See Rudnick supra note 30, at 347. "As a fellow service provider of public
goods, nonprofits should not be taxed for [public goods] or pay charges for them."
I& at 345.
177. See Rudnick, supra note 30, at 347.
178. See LENARDSON & BLAISDELL, supra note 43, at 7 (recommending amend-
ments to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(1)(L) (West 1990)).
179. See id. at 24. Municipalities have litigated to try to remove exemptions from
property that produces revenue for the nonprofit. However, the Maine Law Court
has upheld the exemptions for such property which "is not oriented toward pecuni-
ary profit" but, rather, to "serve the purpose for which the [nonprofit] was organ-
ized." Maine Med. Ctr. v. Lucci, 317 A.2d 1, 2 (Me. 1974).
180. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994).
[Vol. 49:399
LAND CONSERVATION
exempt organization's prorated charge for direct services, to the ex-
clusion of any compensating factor for the amount of direct services
that the exempt organization provides to the municipality. While a
laudable clause in the proposed bill exempts non-improved land and
tax-exempt entities that spend over half of their annual income on
goods and services for the poor, the formula otherwise lacks the
"benefit" inquiry of the cost-benefit analysis that this Comment has
urged is the central issue in assessing the role of nonprofits in soci-
ety. The proposed statute addresses this issue only vaguely, by al-
lowing payment of the service charges to be made in-kind, in the
form of goods or services provided to the municipality or its resi-
dents at no or reduced charge.181 This provision offers no guidance
as to how such in-kind payments are to be valued, seeming to leave
the town with the ability to disallow a nonprofit's claimed in-kind
payment if the town perceived it to be immeasurable or inadequate
to pay the service charge.
A system of reasoned accounting doubtless has a valuable role in
local government administration, provided that it is not a system
that exacts socially useful resources from charitable organizations
without a full cost-benefit analysis.182 While conservation land is
currently exempted from the proposal, future legislation might in-
clude unimproved property-and the benefits that conservation
lands provide could be similarly ignored and their acreage
assessed.183
VI. CuRRNT UsE TAx LAWS AS ANOTHER OPTION FOR A FAIR
TAX ON CONSERVATION LANDS
Where a conservation organization in Maine decides, for diplo-
matic or other reasons, not to apply for tax exemption on a prop-
erty, like any landowner, it has the right to enroll the property in a
current use program, where it is likely to pay taxes at a rate far be-
low full assessed value."s This section examines how current use
programs function, and considers to what extent they are an appro-
priate and just mechanism for the taxation of conservation land. It
181. See LENAsON & BLAmOELT, supra note 43, at 9, 25.
182. Tax-exempt entities that spend half or more of their income providing goods
and services for persons below the poverty level would be exempt from the pro-
posed legislation. See id. at 23. This provision answers potential criticism that the
proposal prejudices such charities while favoring organizations owning conservation
land.
183. Other states have given local governments the power to impose service fees,
but based on their experience it is unclear whether most local officials want this
authority or are willing to use it. See Rosner, supra note 14, at 103. "[Iff we take
recent events as our guide, we will continue to see modest legislative proposals...
by minor classes of exempt property, but few, if any, will be enacted." Id.
184. See Maine Tree Growth Tax Law, M_. REv. STAT. Am. tit. 36, § 572 (West
1990).
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questions whether the programs are useful and fair adjustments to
the tax system, and whether they should be the nonprofit conserva-
tion organization's only option.
Maine law has required that land be assessed at just value since
the Act of Separation in 1820.11 In the 1970s the Legislature deter-
mined that taxing timber land ad valorem was not encouraging for-
est land owners to operate on a sustained yield basis and that public
policy would be best served by tax measures that would "protect this
unique economic and recreational resource."1 6 The legislature
chose to enact current use tax laws allowing qualifying land owners
to have their lands taxed at the value of the existing use of the land
rather than at its ad valorem "highest and best economic use" or
"just value."'"
The Maine statute is comparable to similar statutes in nearly
every state providing tax relief for agricultural, forest, scenic,
habitat, or recreational land.' Such statutes use "preferential" tax-
ation programs to effect land use policy where the property tax is
exerting influence perceived as contrary to optimal use of land.'8 9
This influence is often seen where growth and development cause
land values to rise, resulting in tax levels that make it difficult for
agricultural and forest uses to operate at a profit. 9° Another stat-
ute offers similar reductions in property tax for land owners who
maintain their land in an undeveloped state, even if they do not
farm or harvest timber on the land.191 This statute was stimulated
by similar pressures forcing owners to develop because of increased
property taxes based on the land's speculative value. 192 Despite
185. See KARIN MARCHrI-KAISER, MAMH COAST HERrrAGE TRUST, TEcrnm.
cAL BuLLmiN No. 104, PROPERTY TAXATION OF CONSERVATION LAND 3 (1995).
186. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 572. For an explanation of technical details
of the Maine Tree Growth Tax Law see MAiNE BUREAU OF TAXATION, PROPERTY
TAX BUL.ETiN No. 19 (1995).
187. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 572. In some states efforts to achieve
uniformity in property revaluations spurred the adoption of current use programs in
order to codify extra-legal assessing procedures that were already in practice in pref-
erential use taxation. See MALmE, supra note 121, at 21.
188. See MALME, supra note 121, at 21-25.
189. See id. at 25. "[T]raditional principles of appraisal based on highest and best
economic use conflict with the social and political notions that the highest and best
use of agricultural, forest and open space lands are their present uses." Id. For an
example of how current use taxation can be used to influence natural resource pol-
icy, see William Butler, Deny Current Use Tax Breaks to Landowners Who Export
Raw Logs, N. FoREST F., Mid-Summer 1994, at 16 (recommending no aee Growth
tax shelter for landowners whose exports undermine Maine economy).
190. See MALrm, supra note 121, at 2.
191. See Farm and Open Space Tax Law, MN. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 1102(6)
(West 1990).
192. See MARCHEmTrI-KAISER, supra note 185, at 4 (describing current use legisla-
tion and conservation easements as responses to the fact that "the property tax has
emerged as a driver of land use").
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inevitable criticism that current use policy is an inefficient, interven-
tionist land use policy, its continued widespread support in state leg-
islatures supports its utility."9
Maine's statutes embody the above precepts. The purpose of the
Maine Tree Growth Tax Law is to tax forest lands "on the basis of
their potential for annual wood production"'" rather than on the
conventional basis of their highest and best use, in order to en-
courage sustained yields."95 Thus, a forest landowner whose forest
management and harvest plan is certified by a licensed professional
forester on a fifty-acre hardwood stand, for example, will be valued
at a standard rate, adjusted by county, for that stand type.1 6 Be-
cause this current use rate is usually well below the normal assess-
ment, the Legislature reimburses the town for up to "90% of the per
acre tax revenue lost as a result" of the Maine Tree Growth Tax
Law"9 when the program is fully funded. 9 To further the purposes
of the statute, withdrawal of the property from the program for de-
velopment or otherwise triggers at least the constitutionally man-
dated minimum penalty 9 or a higher penalty between twenty to
thirty percent of the fair market value of the withdrawn land, which
attempts to recapture the tax benefit that the landowner has en-
joyed while the property was involved in the program" °
193. See MAL~m, supra note 121, at 2, 3.
194. Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 572 (West 1990).
195. See id. This rationale has been the basis for current use taxation on forest
land since the nineteenth century. In fact, even early legislation sought to conserve
the tax base by preventing the wasting of timberland. See MlME,, supra note 121,
at 5, 29 & n.27.
196. See MARcHmr-KAsER, supra note 185, at 13. Rates in 1996 range from
$40.00 to $210.00 per acre. See iU The plan must be consistent with sound forestry
practices and the growth of timber for commercial use, although no sale of products
nor intensive harvesting is required. See id. at 13-14.
197. Mn. Rlv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 578(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997). Spe-
cifically, the reimbursement is 90% of the difference between the Maine Tree
Growth Tax and the tax on the state's average undeveloped land value, currently set
at approximately $500. See MARCHrTFX-KAtsER, supra note 185, at 13. A munici-
pality also receives penalty revenues from land removed or disqualified from current
use classification in its jurisdiction. See Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 578(1).
198. If the sum of all claims in a given year exceeds the Legislature's appropria-
tion, reimbursements are prorated among municipalities. See i4 § 578. The Tree
Growth and Open Space reimbursement requirements pre-date Article IV of the
Maine Constitution. Article IV requires the State to reimburse each municipality
for at least "50% of the property tax revenue loss suffered by that municipality...
because of the statutory property tax exemptions or credits enacted after April 1,
1978." Mn. CONST. art. IV, pt 3, § 23.
Only Michigan and Wisconsin have eliminated revenue loss at the local level in
their current use tax relief program for farmers. See MAtum, supra note 121, at 22.
199. Mn. CONST. art. IX, § 8(2).
200. See MrE. R-v. STAT. ArNN. tit. 36, § 581 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997)
(describing the calculations for the penalty). The constitutionally mandated mini-
mum penalty "calls for the recapture of taxes that would have been due in each of
the previous five years ... had the real estate been assessed ... at its 'fair market
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The Farm and Open Space Tax Law provides analogous provi-
sions for agricultural lands and lands that provide public benefit by
conserving scenic resources, enhancing public recreation, promoting
game management, or preserving wildlife or wildlife habitat.20 1 The
Legislature determined "that it is in the public interest to prevent
the forced conversion of farmland and open space land to more in-
tensive uses as the result of economic pressures caused [by taxation]
at values incompatible with their preservation as such farmland and
open space land .... ,2  There is currently no reimbursement for
towns from the state for the Farm and Open Space Tax Law.2"3
In the Open Space classification, assessors have the option of val-
uing the land as if it were permanently undevelopable, or using a
simpler formula that reduces the ordinary assessed valuation by cu-
mulative percentage reductions for ordinary open space (20%), per-
manently protected open space land (30%), forever wild open space
land (20%), and open space land open to public access (25%).204
Thus, open space land that was permanently protected, forever wild,
and open to public access would have its valuation reduced by 95%.
The valuation of forested Open Space acreage cannot be reduced
below the rate it would have under the Tree Growth Tax Law, nor
can Open Space valuation exceed just value as defined by Maine
statute.20 5
The expansion of current use taxation on non-commercial land is
indicative of the non-economic values furthered by current use laws
that have gained popular support in states like Maine. These non-
economic values (for example, scenic, ecological, recreational) 20 6
are also increasingly being sought from lands benefiting from agri-
cultural and forestry current use tax programs. 2 7 In other words,
value on the date of withdrawal,' minus all taxes paid during those previous five
years, plus interest." MARcH-r-KAisER, supra note 185, at 15 (quoting section
581). Section 581 also allows qualifying property to be transferred without penalty
to another current use classification such as Farm and Open Space. See Id. See also
ME. CoNsT. art. IX, § 8(2).
201. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1102(6) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997).
For detailed information on the Open Space Law, see MAxNE BUREAU OF TAXA.
noN, PROPERTY TAx BunLLriN No. 18 (1993); MARCHETn-KAISER, supra note
185, at 18-25.
202. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1101 (West 1990). Farmland classification
values currently range from $250 to $500 per acre. See MARCHEMr-KALSER, supra
note 185, at 12. The values are based on the average productive value of different
types of farmland and "may not reflect development or market value purposes other
than agricultural or horticultural use." ME. REv. STAT. ANNi. tit. 36, § 1105 (West
1990 & Supp. 1996-1997).
203. See MARCHE-Yr-KAISER, supra note 185, at 20.
204. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1106-A(2) (West Supp. 1996-1997).
205. See id See also id. § 701-A (West 1990 & Supp. 1996-1997) (defining just
value).
206. See MALmE, supra note 121, at 6.
207. See id
['Vol. 49:399
LAND CONSERVATION
taxpayers scrutinizing perceived revenue losses may question cur-
rent use programs whose benefits to the private commercial concern
outweigh those provided to the general public.20
The nonprofit conservation organization has not been portrayed,
of course, in the same light as the commercial concern, inimi ing
any public policy criticism of the current use program in this context.
The largest drawback to the current use program for the nonprofit is
that despite its reduced tax assessment it nonetheless adds costs to
the nonprofit's operations that could be better spent in furthering its
mission. The organization forced to enroll a property in current use
because a municipality has refused a properly filed request for ex-
emption is in an awkward situation, especially if the municipality
provides minimal or no services to the property, or where the prop-
erty requires none. In spite of having complete legal basis for the
exemption, the desire for amicable town relations usually forecloses
legal action and current use may be the only means of avoiding liti-
gation or a tax lien, unless a donation in lieu of taxes can be negoti-
ated. While not an inappropriate reflection of the costs and benefits
of conservation land in many situations, current use taxation should
not be seen as a way to replace tax exemption for nonprofit organi-
zations holding land for the benefit of the public.
Current use programs implicate the same set of cost-benefit anal-
ysis questions as exemption policy, and local governments have simi-
lar concerns about the loss of tax revenue. 9 Yet, for the same
reason that this Comment has provided a basis to sustain exemption
of conservation land, the reduced taxation of conservation land in
current use programs is sound public policy, especially where, as in
208. See generally id. (suggesting that taxpayers will be less supportive of current
use programs "if they perceive their extra tax burden is giving 'tax breaks' to 'unde-
serving' land owners").
It should be noted that forest land holdings are also taxed by a statewide assess-
ment by the Commercial Forestry Excise Tax levied on owners of 500 or more acres
of forest land, to pay for the cost of fire control as calculated by the State Tax As-
sessor. See ME. Rnv. STAT. ANNa. tit. 36, § 2721 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995-1996). In
addition, the Maine Spruce Budworm Management Act imposes an excise tax on
owners of forest land located within the spray program area. See M_ Rxv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 8421 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996-1997). These modest, state-imposed
forestry taxes are indicative of the existing state taxes that measure the cost of serv-
ices provided to forest land. While narrow in scope, they suggest how the overall
statewide taxation system can measure benefits provided by a given land type and
tax it accordingly. While one might worry that this logic could lead to a hopeless
proliferation of excise taxes, there is equity in a system in which property owners
"render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's."
209. See MAU.Im, supra note 121, at 7. For lost revenues not compensated by
state government, most taxing units "are able to raise the tax rate and shift the loss
of value to other property owners." Id.
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Maine, the current use statutes require clear public benefits to qual-
ify for enrollment.21°
VII. CONCLUSION
Albeit imperfect, exemptions and current use programs are fair
means for encouraging and supporting land uses with substantial
public benefits, and should remain in place. Even if charitable ex-
emptions are a substantial drain on some municipal governments,
the overall value of exempt land uses to society is great. Provided
the Legislature can reduce pressures on the property tax as the
nearly exclusive revenue source for towns in Maine, existing exemp-
tion and current use law does not demand a comprehensive
overhaul.
Numerous strategies should, however, be undertaken both to re-
fine the exemption statute and to moderate the effect of the prop-
erty tax on non-exempt owners. The exemption statute should
clarify certain requirements for charitable and benevolent status, es-
pecially given the Law Court's difficulty in defining the term "chari-
table" under the statute. The requirement stated by the Law Court,
that an organization lessen the burden of government in order to be
exempt, should be further developed and implemented in statutory
language. This would avoid a total lack of accountability if nonprof-
its are exempted by a showing of any colorable benefit of their activ-
ity to society. Additionally, it would avoid the equally undesirable
extreme of denying exemption if a worthy nonprofit service is not
one that state government is required by statute to provide.
The Legislature should avoid overly harsh reductions in tax ex-
emptions, because nonprofits selflessly provide benefits to society.
Such reactive legislation is probable due to discontent with the
property tax, but can be avoided by efforts to diversify local tax ba-
ses with mechanisms that are productive and fair. Carefully crafted
local option taxes and direct benefit service fees are examples that
might serve this purpose.
Equally important is a greater willingness of state government to
take some responsibility for the burdens that its tax exemption pol-
icy has impressed upon local government. Partial compensation
from the state for property tax revenues lost by municipalities to
exempt properties would be at least a constructive beginning at
spreading the financial burden of a government policy that is the
functional equivalent of a state tax. More fully funding the reim-
bursement for local tax revenues reduced by the Tree Growth Tax
Law is similarly critical. Such a compensation scheme would be fair,
210. See hi at 23. "As a public expenditure, preferential taxation is an expensive
method of preserving land unless it is targeted specifically to clear land use goals."
Id.
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and more likely to build the political will to give more regular and
sustained attention to exemption policy and how its costs and bene-
fits are shared.
Kirk G. Siegel

